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To The Readers:
This is our first issue since being elected editors of Theory and Re-
search in Social Education . We were pleased to assume the responsi-
bility of editorship because of the tradition that has been established
in the few years of publication . The vitality of a scholorly field is
represented by the literature that exists to express its ideas, purposes
and direction. Under the previous editors, the Journal has provided
an important forum for members of the field to give coherence to the
problems, issues and dilemmas that confront social studies education .
We hope to be able to continue that scholarly tradition during our own
tenure .
The imagination and creativity of a discipline is related to the dia-
logue and conflict that exists about the purpose, procedures and find-
ings ofits inquiry . The conflict of ideas and resulting cross-fertilization
that occurs in scientific communities helps to prevent the crystaliza-
tion and reification of ideas .
As editors, we intend that the Journal continue to present argu-
ments from the many intellectual traditions present in social science
philosophy, history and the teaching of social studies . Further, we
hope that critical responses to Journal articles can be published, such
as the Shaver and Anyon interchange in this issue .
In the following issues we shall discuss current issues in the field
through a book review section . Jack Nelson of Rutgers University has
agreed to edit a section that reviews significant literature relevant
to social studies education. We also invite notices of professional meet-
ings in social studies and related fields that might be of interest to
our readers .
Finally, being editors for one issue has been enlightening . We have
sharpened our bookkeeping skills (hopefully), learned about copywrit-
ing, made clearer the operations of the printing business, checked out
office procedures in the university and National Council for the Social
Studies, and learned what "wait time" is. We have become good story
tellers about the post office and the xerox machine. We have also
realized what Godfather means - it is a Lee Ehman who keeps good
records and does not mind phone calls about details that make new
editors nervous .
Thomas S. Popkewitz
B . Robert Tabachnick
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DEFINING SOCIAL PROBLEMS
Samuel S. Shermis Purdue University
James L. Barth Purdue University
Introduction
Of all the paradoxes embedded in the social studies, the most puz-
zling involves the term "social problem." First, the selection of social
problems by teachers of history, civics, economics and the rest has
little or nothing to do with social problems as they are studied by
social scientists. Second, the rationale for the study of social prob-
lems in the social studies movement is based is ignored in theory
and denied in practice .
To develop these two propositions, we shall analyze the relation-
ships among the definition of social problems, social studies and the
social sciences . We propose, first, to comment upon the original ra-
tionale for social studies as we have come to understand it .' Second,
we shall focus upon the history of the discipline of sociology and es-
pecially upon the definition of the term "social problem" as it has been
used from the 1890s to the present .2 Finally, we shall draw some im-
plications for the teaching of social studies.
The Social Studies at Birth
In our recent work on the nature, structure and goals of the social
studies, we decided that there are at least three distinct traditions,
all having their roots in the distant past (Barr, Barth, Shermis, 1977,
1978) . One tradition we designated Reflective Inquiry (RI), a term
which combines the meanings of "reflective thinking" as used by John
Dewey and "inquiry" as it has come to be employed in the last decade
or two. The essential purpose of RI, we thought, was to teach students
to make decisions in complex and morally ambiguous circumstances
because our society long ago decided that the making of decisions, i.e .,
self-rule in a political democracy, must be taught the young and
schools are taken to be the ideal place for this . We have since come
to believe that the social studies arose in the second and third decades
of this century as a direct response to perceived complexity . The growth
of an urban civilization - and the concommitant fading away of a more
simple, agrarian, small town life - was accompanied by industrialism,
the importation of exotic philosophical doctrine, ethnic conflict, ex-
panding and painful contact with other nations and most especially
the changes wrought by an ingenious technology . These and other
complexities generated the understandable response that American
public schools could no longer rely upon transmission of a relatively
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few core values. The vastly complicated newer way of life mandated
an approach that would teach the young to understand and to cope
by training them in a mode ofproblem analysis .
Such an approach to social studies was based, in part, upon the writ-
ings of John Dewey, in particular his How We Think,3 the point of
which was to convince teachers that teaching should naturally follow
the way the mind works to solve a confronting problem . Social studies
educators early perceived that this could best be done by building the
curriculum upon social problems . Unfortunately, there is good rea-
son to believe that Dewey's use of the term was never understood by
the profession . The result was that while social problem, problem
solving and problem were used, and continue to be used, none of these
concepts was ever employed in a clear sense .
Individual social studies educators, to be sure, did attempt to trans-
late Dewey's theories of problem-solving into curriculum . Thus, be-
ginning in the 1920s, Earl and Harold Rugg produced curriculum
materials designed to reflect a Deweyan problem-solving orientation .
And in more recent times, Paul and Lavone Hanna and Hilda Taba
developed both a curriculum framework and materials based upon a
clear notion of problem-solving . However, the Rugg materials were
forced out of schools by the late 1940s and there is no good evidence
that the Hanna or Taba materials continue to be widely used on a
national level . In any event, a problem solving curriculum - in the
sense that Dewey defined the term - was not, in fact, accepted by the
field . 4
As Dewey approached "problem" and "problem-solving," he talked
of an obstacle or barrier to thought . A problem arises when an in-
dividual is confronted by some discrepancy, some deficiency or con-
flict in feeling . In order to clear up the felt difficulty, one engages in
consecutive and serious thought . However, as the term was subse-
quently utilized, teachers substituted a variety of other meanings for
problem defined as something that someone owns, internalizes, feels .
Thus, teachers simply renamed a familiar concept and called it a prob-
lem, e .g ., the topic Western Migration was now called The Problem
of Moving Westward . Or, in recent years, teachers have attempted
to create curriculum around the problems traditionally classified by
scholarly disciplines . For instance, it has been possible to select from
the discipline of anthropology a persistent problem and then label
the curriculum derived therefrom "problem-solving ." There are many
instances of other kinds of problems being substituted for Dewey's
conception. But the point is that all were called problems and there-
fore anyone who wished to claim that he was engaged in "problem-
solving" could do so and there was none to deny it .5
The essential reason for advocating the study of problem was tied
in with the idea of the integration of knowledge . Problems recom-
mended for study were to help young people learn to integrate knowl-
edge, data, and information . The assumption was that in actual life
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people facing a problem make use of data from whatever source is
available - from memory, observation, experimentation or written
authorities . Sources of data are not confined to a single discipline, one
book or a field of study . It was clear even at the turn of the century that
most complex issues require data from many disciplines and from
sources that are within no discipline; and indeed problems often force
the creation or merging of new disciplines, as bio/chemistry, astro/
physics, socio/biology, social psychiatry, political socialization and
the like . Thus, at 'the turn of the century as now, it was clear that
easing lethal conflicts, deciding how to use technology humanely,
coping with poverty - all require insights from philosophy, litera-
ture, history and all of the sciences and social sciences. Useful knowl-
edge comes from who or whatever is disposed to provide it . And one
does not know all of the sources of data prior to beginning inquiry .
To summarize, then, integration in the early Twentieth Century
social studies sense meant integration from any source of knowledge.
Use meant use in the solution of whatever problems face humanity
and have been defined as such. We wish to conclude this section with
the observation that those who were present at the creation of the
social studies movement could not anticipate what would happen to
their convictions about problem solving and integration . They could
not predict that most teachers would redefine "problem" as a topic or
subject of study . Nor could they know in advance that "integration"
would be construed to mean selection of information from any source
for the single purpose of driving home a moral lesson .
We need now to turn to the origin of the definition of social prob-
lem within the field of sociology . At a recent scholarly meeting, 6 Michael
Lybarger revealed that his research on the 1916 report - which exer-
cised a good deal of influence on the thinking of subsequent social
studies educators - was heavily dominated by sociologists . Since this
appears to be true and since it was this committee that urged the study
of social problems on teachers of social studies, it behooves us to know
more about the sociologists' approach to the topic . There is another
rationale for knowing more about sociologists' thinking, quite apart
from the presumed impact on the social studies . A study of how another
field with the same professional and intellectual concern went about
their task should prove illuminating . Since there is some overlap in
both the concern and the time period, the definition, research methods
and techniques of one should be of interest to the other .
There is, in addition, one other persuasive reason to concentrate
on the approach to defining "Social Problem" from the discipline of
sociology. While, to be sure, all disciplines deal with problems, one
in particular seems to have been concerned in any extended and ana-
lytical sense with definition . From the beginning of the third decade
of this century sociologists became conscious of the need for a concep-
tual framework and from the 1920s onward journals, monographs and
books have been engaged in an apparently unceasing debate as to the
meaning and implication of "social problem ."
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Sociologists Define Social Problems : The First Stage
In the beginning, there was no definition of social problem . (Sher-
mis, Barth, 1978, p . 2-5) Sociologists announced or pointed to a prob-
lem - crime, intemperance, poverty . Their treatment of the subject
was a mixture of naming, speculating and describing with occasional
forays into social amelioration . A sense of the haphazard arrangement
of concepts into lists of social problems can be gleaned from the table
of contents of one work: (Dealy, 1909)
I. Ignorance
II. Exploitation
III. Pauperism
IV. Crime
V. Sexual Immorality
VI. Intemperance
The reference to social amelioration above refers to the fact that those
who called themselves and were called sociologists included a good
many social workers, reformers, clerics and others who were angered
and shocked by what they saw around them in the crime ridden cities,
newly bloated with immigrants from all over the world . An example
of a compound of assertion, speculation and unacknowledged assump-
tions comes from this Nineteenth Century abstract :
One of the most serious social problems of the day is presented
by the rapid increase of large towns, more especially of London ; and
there is a tendency to regard the increase as wholly undesirable,
and to some extent unnatural . (Dendy, 1895, p . 28)
From a 1920 work is this mixture of data-less speculation and in-
dignation :
Again, civilization strengthens, rather than weakens man's phys-
ical and psychical nature . One often hears that civilization develops
a type of man aged at forty and a nervous wreck at fifty . This, of
course, is not true civilization, but a civilization in which social
energy has been highly stimulated without being regulated by
scientific knowledge nor directed into the most useful channels by
right education . (Binder)
Writing at a later time - when sociologists had turned a critical
rejecting eye upon earlier attempts to conceptualize the term - one
author argues :
Most of the early texts made no effort to orient the problems dis-
cussed to a more systematic framework of sociological theory. Each
problem is considered more or less at random with reference to het-
erogeneous factual material, biological, psychological, or political
in nature. No attention is given to interrelationships or classifica-
tion of problems .'
The author is probably correct in this observation for it is clear that
sociologists writing between the late Nineteenth Century and the
1930s lacked any specific sociological framework . Their propositions
were largely a mixture of judgments and facts from philosophy, medi-
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cine, history, economics and other sources . There were few coherent
categories and one often finds speculation being substituted for ex-
planation .
The eminent sociologist, C. Wright Mills, explained this historical
phase of the discipline by arguing that early sociologists came from a
rural, agrarian, small town background and were outraged by the
spectacle of massed immigrants, dirt, illiteracy, prostitution, disease,
political corruption and the like . Their inability to penetrate the com-
plexity of the new urban framework permitted them to denounce and
then to gather facts selectively to support their assertions . But growth
of the discipline and improved methods of observation, recording, in-
ference and interpretation did not permit this stage to last forever .
By the mid 1920s we begin to see attempts at holistic approaches and
tentative criteria for a definition of social problem .
We do not wish to suggest that there was no sociological framework
available to early sociologists for this is not true at all. Historians,
philosophers and social scientists had proposed comprehensive frame-
works for the definition of a social problem for many decades . Hegel,
for instance, would have perceived social problems as the necessary
accompaniment to thesis-anti-thesis conflict . Marx thought that social
problems - at least in the contemporary world - are a function either
of class conflict within a society or capitalist conflict between societies .
Spengler and Toynbee would probably have understood social prob-
lems as manifestations of a given historical developmental stage with-
in a society. Durkheim saw suicide, anomie, etc ., as a natural conse-
quence of the loss of moral guidelines and folkways . This list could
be extended to include many 19th Century sociologists . However, it
is one thing to talk about a comprehensive conceptual framework and
it is another for people to be aware of one. There is little evidence that
sociologists writing between, say, 1890 and 1925 either paid much
attention to Marx, Hegel, Tonybee, Weber, Spengler, Toennies, Durk-
heim, etc., or even that they had translations. Thus, while there was
a sociological framework - indeed, there were a good many competing
sociological frameworks - they were not widely used by the sociolo-
gists of that generation . 8
In retrospect we can perceive some implications of this first stage
of sociologists' concern for social problems . First, without a context,
without criteria for a definition, without a theoretical framework, the
sociologists' efforts were fragmentary and piecemeal . And as a result
they were unconvincing . Second, it would seem that the unrecognized
preconceptions - what Mills would call the agrarian influence -
actually blinded sociologists to their subject . For instance, obsessed
as they were with the graft and devious political behavior of ward
heelers, sociologists of that time usually did not perceive that politi-
cians performed absolutely essential social services - from locating
jobs for incoming immigrants to finding coal for the destitute widow .
Finally, when all was said and done, little actually resulted from the
sociologists' labors. There is little evidence that sociologists influ-
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enced public opinion in any discriminable way or that their scholarly
evidence shaped legislation. Indeed, the Immigration Act of 1924 was
based upon most unsociological views and upon statistical evidence
that was immediately disavowed . In short, the first stage, although
productive of books, monographs, and articles was a dead end . If social
studies educators had been paying attention, they might have learned
an important lesson : research on social problems without a theoreti-
cal framework, without awareness of the part played by one's own
values and assumptions is likely to be sterile and unproductive . Un-
fortunately, as we shall see, social studies people were not paying
close attention .
The Second Stage
The second stage - "stage" is not really a good term and "tendency"
or some other term suggesting more gradual re-emphasis would be
better - arrived as scholars became aware of the inadequacy of what
had been done in the name of the sociology of social problems . What
were the needs to which sociologists in the 1930s addressed them-
selves? First, they wished to define the critical term "social prob-
lem." Second, they wanted a theoretical explanation of the concept
with logically consistent categories . Third, they wanted to group or
relate one problem to another in a theoretically consistent category
of some sort.
The theoretical categories began as a way of subsuming all social
problems under one or another single-casual explanation . Thus, one
could attempt to describe every variety of ill as a manifestation of
"the social lag" in which one talked about discontinuities between
prescientific and pretechnological society and the present . Or, the
emphasis could be placed upon "social deviance" or "social pathology"
in which an alleged ill could be perceived as a departure from a healthy
pattern. As much as an improvement as these theoretical categories
were over the haphazard practice of naming and decrying, they, too,
contained their own theoretical difficulties . They were loaded with
unexamined value judgments and assumptions . They were based upon
a medical model (e.g ., "pathology") and this was probably inappropri-
ate and confusing . Others created dubious categories of their own, as
"individual" and "social." And in later years most appeared to be
tainted with a less-than-rigorous, romanticized view of the world .
However, they did lead to more useful and certainly more interesting
ways of conceptualizing the term social problem . 9
Writing in the mid-1920s, Professor L . K. Frank attempted what
appears to be the first definition of social problem :
A social problem, then, appears to be any difficulty or misbehavior
of a fairly large number of persons which we wish to remove or cor-
rect, and the solution of a social problem is evidently the discovery
of a method for this removal or correction. (1924-25, p . 463)
Although Frank makes extensive use of a social lag theory,i° his defi-
nition is clearly an attempt to view a phenomenon in holistic, syste-
matic terms. He pointed out that there is a depressing element of
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hypocrisy in a society in which illegitimacy is considered a serious
problem but in which it would never occur to individuals to re-examine
their attitudes that are the source of the stigma that generates the
problem .
Within a very few years Richard Fuller seized upon Frank's in-
sights and attempted to define social problem . Fuller insisted upon
a multi-causal approach, arguing that many social forces come into
play, thereby excluding the previous decade's single-causal explana-
tions. Further, Fuller argued that "all social problems are not alike"
and " . . . knowledge of the cause of a social problem does not solve the
problem."" He attempted to distinguish among different components
of a social problem, i.e ., what relates to research, to policy and to ad-
ministrative efficiency. Finally, he argued that phenomena relating
to social problems have " . . . a threefold relationship to the cultural
value scheme in which they are imbedded," i .e., one must talk about
value conflicts originating from clashing cultural patterns .
The eventual definition which arrived in the mid 1930s was based
upon a number of assumptions which we shall briefly summarize . First,
a social problem has both an objective, quantifiable dimension and a
subjective, value-laden component. Second, because of the variability
of our society, especially geographical variability, social problems
will vary from place to place and will also vary in the intensity with
which they are perceived. Third, cultural values and especially con-
flicts among cultural values are always involved . Finally, at the very
core of a social problem is disagreement over the nature, meaning and
shape of the problem - it follows that there will be disagreement over
proposed solutions .
Given these assumptions, then, what is the first definition reached
during the 1930s?
"A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable
number of persons as a deviation from social norms which they cher-
ish." (Fuller and Myers, 1941, p . 25)
A slight variation on this:
"A social problem is a condition which is an actual or imagined
deviation from some social norm cherished by a considerable number
of people." (Fuller and Myers, 1941, p . 320)
The history of the late 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s is essentially an
attempt to amplify, refine and explore this definition . Although many
have cast doubt upon all or part of this definition, it has been remark-
ably durable and continues to be held - consciously or otherwise -
by many.
We conclude this section with a few observations and conclusions
about the context of the definition we have just quoted . First, while
not every sociologist accepted the Fuller definition, there is wide-
spread awareness that a more systematic, more sophisticated ap-
proach is needed. Second, while many sociologists are concerned with
social problems, by no means are all. We discovered many texts and
general works in sociology in which there is either none or scarcely
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any mention of the notion of "social problem ." Third, there is a pro-
nounced tendency for discussions of social problems to take place as
a subset of one overriding principle, as a social lag, social pathology,
social disorganization, or less frequently, social deviation . Co-existing
with attempts to conceptualize social problems in a logical and co-
herent sociological framework, however, are still many vestiges of
what we have called Stage I thinking . Thus, one still finds categories
which do not communicate, pseudo-explanations, data-less specula-
tion, moral outrage and pale descendants of Aristotelian philosophy .
Our conclusion is that by the 1930s sociologists had devised a defini-
tion of the term social problem . This definition, whose roots are in
the 1920s, was formulated in the mid 1930s, received substantial
recognition by the 1940s, was amplified throughout the 1950s but by
the 1960s was challenged as philosophically and methodologically
inadequate .
If one asks, Why ought this second stage be of interest to social
studies educators? the answer we believe, is because it reveals quite
clearly that thinking about the difficulties besetting the human race
is apparently so intellectually cumbersome that the best minds with
the best of motivation stumbled along, unable so much as to agree
upon a definition of what they were about . The phrase "unable so
much as to agree" does not suggest that there was something wrong
with sociologists who could not reach consensus on the basics . Rather
it suggests that there is something about the defining process which
poses an almost insurmountable intellectual barrier . A definition is
actually an effort to say something valid and meaningful about all
characteristics within a class . To attempt to define what all social
problems have in common required the thinking of hundreds of scholars
for well over a third of a century . And even then, it proved to be inade-
quate. Once more, the lesson was lost on social studies teachers who,
rather than appreciate the complexities involved in thinking about
social phenomena, preferred instead to let the official curriculum or
the class text do all the thinking for them . Instead of observing and
methodically classifying social problems, social studies teachers ac-
cepted the word of the textbook writer ; if the writer pronounced Crime
or Prostitution a problem so did the teacher . And the teacher insisted
that crime and prostitution were exactly the kind of problem defined
by the writer. All of which is to say that while sociologists were fret-
ting and wondering about the nature and meaning of social problems,
teachers were doing nothing of the sort .
The Third Stage: Saving the Souls of Sociologists
Writing a few years ago, two sociologists delivered an extremely
sharp, even devastating judgment : "There is no adequate defini-
tion of social problems within sociology, and there is not and never
has been a sociology of social problems." (Spector and Kituse, 1977,
p. 1) One is compelled to wonder why, after more than three quar-
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ters of a century, do two sociologists assert that there is not a defi-
nition, not even a viable sociology of social problems? The answer
to this question - assuming that the two are not merely guilty of
hyperbole - requires a brief overview of the history of sociology of
the last twenty-five or thirty years .
First, as we have said, the definition coined in the 1930s survives
to the present. But, as we shall discuss in a moment, it had political
as well as distinctly intellectual functions . That is, it had the effect
of temporarily calming a conflict between different factions of the
American Sociological Association that had been simmering for many
years. In "What Is A Social Problem?" (Shermis and Barth, 1978) we
cite evidence to suggest that two groups of sociologists had contended
for many years . Theoreticians, scholars and researchers approached
social problems from quite a different perspective than social workers,
reformers and what one source calls "ex-clerics ." The definition of a
social problem as a departure from a social norm in effect papered
over the conflict between these two groups . But not for long .
By the 1960s we saw an end to the relative calm of the Eisenhower
years, marked by relative affluence, a lack of vigorous criticism and
a feeling that every day in every way our society was growing better
and better. When the Indochinese war reached its apogee in the mid
1960s, we became aware that the social issues of the 1930s, 1940s and
1950s had not died, been solved or faded away . We discovered that
there were still many who lived as Roosevelt described them in 1933
- "ill fed, ill housed and ill clothed ." We also faced the crisis of our
cities, violent opposition to the Vietnamese war, the resurgence of
the civil rights movement, a sexual "revolution" and what appeared
to be a "drug epidemic ." Perhaps even more substantial, many began
to criticize what appeared to be an economy that predisposed toward
mindless consumption - and the imminent danger of depleted physi-
cal resources . In short, it appeared to some that the affluence and eco-
nomic prosperity of the late 1940s and 1950s had simply obscured
temporarily severe structural conflicts and unresolved issues .
The thrusting of unresolved conflicts so sharply into the lives of
all of us - academic sociologists included - generated some funda-
mental questions about the definition of the social problem that had
been coined in the 1930s . Prompted by black activists, some began to
say, "The problem of poverty and racial prejudice is not the problem
of poor blacks . It is the problem of a racist society that oppresses and
exploits blacks and other minorities ." Rhetoric aside, the significance
of the restatement was to force attention on the meanings of such
terms as "objective," "condition," "influential number," and "depar-
ture." Let us summarize the challenges to the definition that arose
in the 1960s .
1 . What is the meaning of "condition" in the definition of a social
problem as a "condition" which departs from the important social
norm? Are "conditions" objective phenomena or reducible to a value
judgment?
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2 . If reducible to a value judgment, who is making the judgment?
That is, who are the definers of social problems? Do we need to know
the credentials of the definers? Are they bona fide social scientists
who presumably have the expertise to make judgments? And does
this rule out those who are not social scientists?
3 . Are all social problems the "same" or can one talk intelligibly
about departures from social norms which truly threaten cherished
values but which are not so defined by a large or influential segment
of the populace? And what, by the way, is an "influential" or "impor-
tant" segment? Can one conceivably talk about segments of the popu-
lation which are objectively speaking enormously disadvantaged but
who are not accounted "important?"
4. What is the ultimate end or purpose of the sociologists' labors?
Are sociologists scientists who require no more external rationale for
their labors than do entomologists or musical historians? Do sociolo-
gists study social problems because this contributes to the develop-
ment of theory in the discipline? Or do sociologists study problems
because in some sense they are responsible for a solution?
In the process of researching the monograph from which this arti-
cle is extracted, the authors exchanged correspondence with and inter-
viewed two colleagues, both sociologists of social problems . 12 We par-
ticularly wanted to focus on the shifting emphasis away from a social
problem as a departure to a social problem as a creation, a construct .
We asked Professor Robert Perruci to comment on this . 13 His answer :
What we (the authors of a text on social problems) did was to look
at this definition and say, `That is nonsense . There is no way one
can use that definition without imposing, without making a judg-
ment . . . (about) what a `significant number of people' is, about
what a `violation' is . . . '
If this is granted, then, what are the implications for a problem de-
finer? Speaking to the question in the context of a discussion of poverty
as a social problem, Perruci says :
Poverty exists before people define it as a social problem . Some-
thing can exist as a condition objectively speaking . But before one
can label it as a problem one must state some set of standards about
what constitutes a healthy society .
At this point, we began speaking of the question, What does it mean
to "state some set of standards"? Perruci indicated at length that this
requires an individual to a) project a model of a good society, b) specify
his own values and assumptions, and c) indicate what and how some-
thing is thought to deviate from a cherished value .
Perruci illustrates this by arguing that it makes just as much sense
to say that "The problem is the secondary school" and not as is usually
the case, "The problem is dropouts from secondary schools ." In effect,
then, one can define a social problem any way one wishes - provided
he goes through the process described above. To shift the emphasis
from a problem as a departure to the problem as a human construct
has the additional effect of allowing minorities or the poor to nominate
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a problem, i.e ., to place an item on the social agenda for examination
and remediation .
In brief, the history of the last twenty or so years saw a series of
challenges to the accepted definition of the 1930s of a social problem
as a departure from an important social norm . Following heated ex-
changes on such questions as What is objective and what subjective?
What part is played by the values of the definer? What is the political
role of any definition? Of what does an alleged deviation consist? Many
sociologists of social problems decided that the seemingly objective
and scientific definition of the 1930s created as many problems and
issues as what it had been designed to replace . Honesty, intellectual
precision and certain humane assumptions, therefore led not to a new
definition as much as an emphasis on the process by which any defini-
tion is reached .
Implications for Social Studies
We began this article by asserting that of all the paradoxes that
plague the social studies, the most distressing are those that deal
with problem, problem solving and social problems . Although it is
a truism that social studies ought to teach a mode of problem solving,
and although it is a platitude to claim that the social studies curricu-
lum should deal with social problems, research on the matter sug-
gests that neither was or is the case. There is no defensible approach
to social problems and no systematic mode of social problem analysis .
And the problem upon which problem solving is thought to be based
has been replaced by topics and subjects that have been traditionally
taught but were renamed to conform to the new intellectual fashion .
Let us deal with both claims, beginning with a look at the treatment
of social problems in the social studies .
An examination of social studies curriculum and practices suggests
that practitioners approach social problems in ways consistent with
what sociologists were doing in the late Nineteenth and early Twenti-
eth Centuries. Books called Problems of Democracy or Social Prob-
lems, for instance, are essentially compilations which breathe life
into Professor Fuller's charge that texts
. . . make no effort to orient the problems discussed to a syste-
matic framework of sociological theory . Each problem is considered
more or less at random with reference to heterogeneous factual
materials . . . No attention is given to interrelationships or classi-
fication of problems .
The courses, therefore, are a smorgasbord of labels such as Crime,
Alcoholism, Poverty, Drug Addiction, Prostitution, much as we saw
in texts written sixty, seventy or eighty years ago . Presentation as-
sumes that something, e.g ., pre-marital sexual intercourse or pot
smoking is a "deviation" and the task is simply to persuade students
to this effect . There is usually no historical context for any problem
so that students rarely make the connection between something called
discrimination against black Americans and the Reconstruction peri-
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od. The latter is "covered" in U .S. History and the former in Social
Problems class . Thus, there are few "interrelationships," because
teachers neither know how nor are predisposed to seek connections
between our economic system, poverty and racial discrimination . Thus,
the selection of data is so inherently biased that, for instance, "Crime"
is reduced to crimes of violence or crimes committed by the lower class,
with a concommitant embarrassingly inadequate treatment of white
collar crime . 14 Teachers tend to confine themselves to social prob-
lems which are traditionally labeled as such and to mix statistical
description and denunciation in equal measure . We have rarely seen
students invited or even permitted to interpret the problem on their
own terms. In conclusion, social studies teachers are approximately
fifty to seventy-five years behind the state of the art . The proclaim-
ing and identifying of social problems, with editorial lament, has little
in common either with scholarship or the goals of social studies . Which
gets us around to the nub of the question : What do we find objection-
able about the entire process? What are the practical consequences
of calling the confusion and inept practices associated with social
problems and problem solving to the attention of the profession?
First, please recall the discussion on pages two and three concern-
ing the rationale for the study of social problems . If a problem is not
identified, if individuals are not encouraged to own or internalize a
problem, there cannot be subsequent problem-solving thought. Dewey's
suggestion that a problem must first be identified before hypothesiz-
ing, data-gathering, inferences, analysis, evaluation, etc ., can take
place is probably still valid . To tell students that, for example, Crime
or Prejudice is a problem simply bypasses the first and essential stage .
Without problem identification there is little point in talking about
problem solving .
Second, if there is no problem solving, there is no integration . If
one does not select and appraise data from a wide variety of sources,
there is no sense in which integration - in the original sense of the
term as employing data from a wide variety of sources - can mean-
ingfully be used . The integration that social studies founding fathers
discussed is akin to the notion of philosophical reconstruction . One
reconstructs an outlook, that is, one processes knowledge and values
in an attempt to come to a more adequate and harmonious under-
standing both of one's beliefs about the world and the world itself .
There are other senses in which one can use the term integration, 15
but the sense in which we use it conforms closely to the official ratio-
nale of the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) . In a num-
ber of publications 16 the National Council maintained that the way
in which social studies goals are reached include gaining knowledge,
processing information, appraising values and becoming committed
to civic participation .
Third, if there is no integration of knowledge, students do not gain
in the skills of decision-making. If one assumes that decision-making
is the rationale for social studies - the "heart of social studies" as
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Professor Shirley Engle maintained - and if social studies does not
deal with decision-making, there is no sense in which one can mean-
ingfully talk about reaching the goals of the social studies . There is
ample evidence that the social studies do not even teach lower level
knowledge skills successfully and it therefore seems extremely un-
likely that it is teaching higher level application, analysis, synthesis
and evaluation skills with any notable degree of success .
In short, we contend that the consequences of operating without
theoretical guidance for problem solving, problem identification and
selection of social problems is a curriculum that is devoid of prob-
lems . That is, unless one sides with the Queen of Hearts, who, had
she been a social studies teacher, would shriek, "A problem is what
I say it is, no more and no less." Without problem solving, without
integration, without decision-making skills, there is no warrant to
believe that the social studies is developing competence in what is
taken to be its supreme goal : preparing citizens to rule themselves
in a complex and shifting environment .
Those who may not be familiar with the research literature of the
last 45 or 50 years on teaching practices within the social studies may
also not be aware that the generalizations we have made about the
absence of problem solving are supported by abundant evidence . Simply
the most recent summary of evidence is the article by Shaver, Davis
and Helburn, whose not very optimistic conclusions include the fol-
lowing:
. . materials from the federally-funded New Social Studies
projects of the 1960s and 1970s are not being selected for classroom
use . . ."
"The dominant instructional tool continues to be the conventional
textbook . . . "
"There is little interdisciplinary teaching, and little attention
to societal issues ."
"The `knowing' expected of students is largely information-
oriented."
"Students generally find social studies content and modes of
instruction uninteresting ."
. . Implicitly, content and classroom interactions are typically
used to teach students to accept authority and to have them learn
`important truths' about our history and government ."
Ergo
If sociologists in the last twenty-five years have a valid point, it
seems defensible to recommend that certain outdated and self-defeat-
ing practices cease . Specifically, compilations of unrelated problems,
laced with dollops of moral indignation have little to do with the state
of the art. Curriculum projects, textbooks, teaching techniques,
etc., proceed on the assumption that if one tells people what a prob-
lem is, it is OK to call that problem solving . This is neither theo-
retically defensible nor practicable . First, students, should be per-
mitted to define the social problems of their choice . If we can use
an analogue of Perruci's example, it is not necessarily the case that
the problem is pot smoking. One may just as validly define the prob-
lem as the inability to handle pleasure in a society in which Puritan-
ism and self-repression are still the hallmarks . Or one may define
the problem as the need for young people to narcotize themselves
regularly because facing insoluble problems, boredom, and unstimu-
lating environments and dead-end jobs requires one to seek oblivion
daily. One may, however, just as readily define the problem as the
inability of young people to handle their lives with the courage, moral-
ity and self-control of their ancestors . The point is that one may de-
fine the problem as one wishes - provided one goes through the process
of specifying assumptions, delineating values and indicating the
nature of a healthy society . To those who argue that letting a bunch
of kids define a problem any way they want is an invitation to chaos,
the answer is: requiring students to specify their assumptions and
the nature of a deviation from a social norm is the best, the most in-
tellectually respectable and the safest thing that they can do .
Second, there needs to be some closer consonance between the social
problems within our society and the problem solving process in the
classroom. This statement would ordinarily fall between a self-evident
truth and a crashing platitude were it not for one thing : there is and
never has been any consonance between what takes place in class-
rooms and what goes on outside. The practice of naming a social prob-
lem and requiring kids to read elaborate, if misleading descriptions,
and then giving them a true-false multiple-choice test on Friday has
nothing to do with "integrating data from a wide variety of sources ."
If there is to be integration - gaining knowledge and processing in-
formation, to use the NCSS phrase - we shall simply have to adopt a
completely different set of practices .
Two more final questions need to be considered . First, what would
be the consequences of a problem solving social studies curriculum
based on problem defined as "an internalized barrier, a blockage to
one's goal structure which generates puzzlement and confusion and
which must be removed by thinking :" (This is a condensed statement
of John Dewey's approach.) The answer is : a social studies curricu-
lum which made extensive use of problems defined as both social and
personal in nature and which can be determined by teachers to possess
the criteria of a personal-social problem . e.g ., there is much ignorance
and misinformation, a high degree of emotionality, interpersonal con-
flict, illogic, irrationality and intrapersonal conflict . Secondly, what
prevents teachers from immediately making use of such an orienta-
tion to social studies? The answer apparently is that a sine qua non is
teachers who have both a conception of "problem" and a philosophy
and methodology to enable them to employ problem solving. But as
Beale pointed out 45 years ago
The majority of teachers do not know what a controversial sub-
ject is . . . The vast majority share the views and prejudices and
ideals of the community out of which they have sprung and in the
midst of which they teach . The vast majority of teachers have never
done enough thinking to work out an explicit social philosophy . 17
It is long past time for social studies people to think seriously about
the role of problem-solving in classrooms . It is long past the time when
social studies teachers can safely ignore the scholarly methods of the
social sciences. We can do a variety of things . We can ignore our half
century old goals concerning citizenship, decision-making, integra-
tion of knowledge, training for self-rule, complexity, etc . We can de-
clare these statements to be rhetorical, ritualistic nonsense . Or we
can overhaul our practices and actually do what the social studies
founders said we should be doing sixty years ago .
FOOTNOTES
"From material extracted from "Social Studies Goals : The Twentieth
Century Perspective," a chapter in a work on social studies edited
by Professor Charles Berryman of University of Georgia at Athen,
Georgia, to be published in 1979 .
2From the authors' "What is a Social Problem? How Do Sociologists
Define the Term," an unpublished manuscript, 1978, Purdue Univer-
sity, West Lafayette, Indiana, 54 pages .
3John Dewey, How We Think . See also his Logic The Theory of In-
quiry and Essays in Experimental Logic . The former was designed for
teachers and the latter two for his colleagues in philosophy .
4The various meanings of problem are described in the authors'
"We All Know What a Problem Is . Don't We?" Peabody Journal of
Education . 55 (April, 1978) 287-297 . All scholarly disciplines enter-
tain problems which are usually the enduring puzzles that exercise
fascination for researchers decade after decade . Anthropologists have
always found the origins of the human race to be absorbing . From the,
earliest findings in the Neander Valley, through Peking Man to the
present excavations in Olduvai Gorge by the Leakey family, the ques-
tion, When did anthropoids turn into homo sapiens? has attracted
physical anthropologists, archaeologists, paleontologists, etc . We call
these "disciplinary problems" for every discipline organizes its re-
search around attempts to shed light on the persistent, intractable
unknown. To the question, What evidence is there that teachers do
not deal with social problems? we quote from what is only the most
recent treatment of the subject . In an article by three researchers,
the authors say, "Teachers tend to devote their attention to different
aspects of teaching than do professors and curriculum developers .
They are not particularly interested in debates about such matters
as pedagogical styles, different ways of organizing curricula, social
science-social studies distinctions, and on textbook biases. Rather
teachers' concerns center on classroom management and socializa-
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tion - the matters that must be handled to survive each day and to
gain and maintain respect in a social system made up of other teachers,
administrators, parents and students ." See James P. Shaver, O. L .
Davis, Jr., and Suzanne W. Helburn, "The Status of Social Studies
Education: Impressions from Three NSF Studies," Social Education
39 (February, 1975) 150-153 . In short, problem-solving is the con-
cern of professors, curriculum people and theorists . It is not and never
has been the concern of classroom teachers .
5Shermis' "The Social Studies Teacher as Transmitter of Culture,"
a paper given to the Philosophy of Education Society, March, 1975,
Kansas City, Missouri, deals with the proposition that social studies
teachers have tended to accept goals of problem-solving, citizenship,
democracy, etc ., only at the verbal level, that no attempt was made
to translate these into curriculum . This paper also argues that " . . . the
process of socialization is both far more thorough and far more subtle
than we had imagined . In a sense, the Transmitter, as a product him-
self of the socialization process, now has a vested interest - although
an unconscious vested interest - in the culture ." Thus, under the
guise of problem solving or even simply of transmitting a neutral
body of facts, social studies teachers tend most often to be concerned
with inculcation, indoctrination or persuasion .
6Michael Lybarger, Edgewood College, Madison, Wisconsin, is now
completing his doctoral research on this subject . He presented an in-
terim report to the Foundations of the Social Studies Special Interest
Group of the National Council for the Social Studies at Houston, Texas,
November 25, 1978 .
7The author is Richard C . Fuller, "Sociological Theory and Social
Problems," Social Forces 15 (October-May, 1937) p . 496. Fuller and
Richard R . Myers were probably two of the most significant forces in
creating a viable and useful definition of the term social problem .
8For a brief but quite useful summary of pre-modern approaches to
social problems, see Ritchie P . Lowry, Social Problems . A Critical
Analysis of Theories and Public Policy. Lexington: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1974. Although discussion of the historical background
can be found throughout this work, the relevant section is Part I,
Social Problem : Prevailing Views . See also Jerome G . Manis, Analyz-
ing Social Problems . New York: Praeger, 1976 and Malcolm Spector
and John I. Kituse . Constructing Social Problems . Menlo Park: Cum-
mings Publishing Company, 1977 .
9The obviously ambivalent judgment - very flawed but neverthe-
less interesting - is our attempt to teeter between two very different
evaluations. On the one hand, the single-causal approach was full of
methodological flaws which gave birth to overgeneralizations and
distortions. However, the intellectual effort put into the task cer-
tainly must command our respect .
10This was hardly unique with Frank, for Dewey, Mead and others
had recourse to the same concept in many of their works . Dewey's
Reconstruction in Philosophy, Human Nature and Conduct and many
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other works are profound attempts to explain the continuance of be-
havior into a present in which it is dysfunctional .
"Fuller, 1937, p. 499 . See also Richard C. Fuller, "The Problem
of Teaching Social Problems," American Journal of Sociology 44 (July-
May, 1938-39) and Fuller and Richard R . Myers, "Some Aspect of a
Theory of Social Problems," American Sociological Review 6 (1941),
p. 24-32 .
12Professors Robert Perruci and Reece McGee . The latter is in the
midst of preparing a book-length manuscript on social problems and
the former contributed what we take to be the definitive discussion
in the literature on the definition of the term . See Irving Tallman and
Reece McGee, "Definition of a Social Problem," in Erwin 0. Smigel,
Handbook on the Study of Social Problems, (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1970) .
13In an interview at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana,
May 19, 1978 .
14A squib in a recent televised news story described the following :
physicians, pharmacists and medical technologists are accused of rip-
ping off Medicare and Medicaid to the tune of $5,000,000,000 . That
is five billion dollars. The news story indicated that there are not
enough H.E.W. personnel to investigate . Had "welfare chiselers"
made that kind of hit on the taxpayers, there would have been scream-
ing headlines, angry editorials, television commentators white with
anger and all the rest. We saw none of this . We suggest that the social
problems texts, in their skewed treatment of crime, are essentially
following the self-imposed middle-class oriented blinders of the rest
of society .
15In another work, "Social Studies Goals : The Twentieth Century
Perspective," the authors attempt to amplify on three meanings of
integration. In addition to the notion of philosophical reconstruction
which requires integration of facts, values, attitudes, etc., there are
two others . Social science integration - at least in curriculum con-
struction - involves 1. identifying a concept, 2 . labeling the concept
according to its origins in a particular social science and 3 . suggesting
ways by which the teacher can help students understand it . The inte-
gration of Citizenship Transmission is, as we have described it on
page three: the use of information of all kinds from any source for the
single purpose of indoctrinating or driving home a moral point. These
judgments are hardly without refutation made by social studies edu-
cators, social scientists, philosophers and others concerned with edu-
cational foundations. For instance, the authors are taken severely
to task by Irving Morrisett, "Citizenship, Social Studies and the Aca-
demician," Social Education 43 (January, 1979) 12-17 .
16National Council for the Social Studies Position Statement, Social
Studies Curriculum Guidelines . (Washington, D.C . : NCSS, 1971) .
17The Beale work (with a complete citation in the Reference section)
contains an excellent discussion of forces impeding problem-solving
in the social studies . It is somewhat disconcerting to read this work
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and realize that it was written 43 years ago . The authors' works, De-
fining the Social Studies and The Nature of the Social Studies, op. cit .,
is a brief summary and analysis of the problems discussed in this arti-
cle. Finally, for what is still perhaps the definitive work on Deweyan
problem solving in the social studies, see Maurice P . Hunt and Law-
rence Metcalf, Teaching High School Social Studies . (New York :
Harper and Row, Second Edition, 1968), Part II, Method and the Social
Studies .
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SOCIAL EDUCATION IN THE CLASSROOM :
THE DYNAMICS OF THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM
Henry A. Giroux
Boston University
Anthony N. Penna
Carnegie-Mellon University
The belief that schooling can be defined as the sum of its official
course offerings is a naive one . Yet, such an implicit belief served as
the theme of the social studies curriculum development reform move-
ment of the 1960s and early 1970s . Developers believed that if they
changed the curriculum of the nation's schools, the school's ills would
be remedied (Silberman, 1970 ; Spring, 1976) . In recent years, how-
ever, numerous reasons have been offered to explain the seeming
inability of the reform movement to penetrate the traditional pat-
terns of instruction in the schools . Inadequate teacher preparation
and curriculum materials which overestimated the perceived capa-
bilities of students represent the more familiar, albeit uncritical, ex-
planations offered by educators. Now, some of them lend uncritical
support for the "back to basics" movement in social studies educa-
tion, assuming once again that new curriculum materials will pro-
vide an answer to the question of how to bring about change in social
studies education. Attend to the cognitive needs and capabilities of
students, they argue, and the failures of the recent reform movement
will be overcome (Lyons, 1976 ; Brodinsky, 1977) .
Unfortunately, such recommendations are based heavily on struc-
tural-functional educational models of curriculum theory (Pinar,
1978) which fails to perceive the purpose of social education beyond
its limited explicit instructional outcomes . Further, there is a failure
to recognize the complex, intimate relationship between the institu-
tion of the school and the nation's economic and political institutions .
Once the relationship between schooling and the larger society is
recognized, questions about the nature and meaning of the schooling
experience can be viewed from a theoretical perspective capable of
illuminating the often ignored relationship between school knowledge
and social control . By viewing schools within the context of the larger
society, social studies developers can begin to focus on the tacit teach-
ing that goes on in schools and help to uncover the ideological mes-
sages embedded in both the content of the formal curriculum and the
social relations of the classroom encounter .
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It is only recently that some educators have begun to raise ques-
tions which point to the need for a thorough study of the interconnec-
tions between ideology, instruction, and curriculum (Bourdieu and
Passeron, 1977 ; Bernstein, 1977; Young, 1976) . For instance, Michael
Apple argues that we need to:
. . . examine critically not just "how a student acquires more
knowledge" (the dominant question in our efficiency minded field)
but "why and how particular aspects of the collective culture are
presented in school as objective, factual knowledge ." How concretely
may official knowledge represent ideological configurations of the
dominant interests in a society? How do schools legitimate these
limited and partial standards of knowing as unquestioned truths?
These questions must be asked of at least three areas of school life :
1) How the basic day-to-day regularities of schools contribute to
students learning these ideologies; 2) how the specific forms of cur-
ricular knowledge reflect these configurations ; and 3) how these
ideologies are reflected in the fundamental perspectives educators
themselves employ to order, guide, and give meaning to their own
activity (Apple, 1975, pp . 210-211) .
If educators such as Apple, Bourdieu, and Bernstein are correct,
and we think they are, then social studies developers will have to
build their pedagogical models upon a theoretical framework which
situates schools within a socio-political context . As such, the main
assertion of this paper is that if social studies developers seek to change
classroom life through various intervention strategies, then they will
have to comprehend the school as an agent of socialization . Further-
more, they will have to identify those structural properties at the
core of the schooling process which link it to comparable properties
in the workplace and other socio-political spheres . In brief, they will
have to approach their task systemically rather than in the tradi-
tional fragmented fashion which assumes incorrectly that the class-
room can become a vehicle for helping each student to develop his/her
full potential as a critical thinker and responsible participant in the
democratic process by changing only the content and methodology of
the school's official social studies curricula .
We believe that a major task for social studies educators is to iden-
tify those social processes which work against the ethical and politi-
cal purpose of schooling in a democratic society and construct new
elements which provide the underpinning for new social studies pro-
grams. Initially, developers will have to understand the contradic-
tions between the official curriculum, namely the explicit cognitive
and affective goals of formal instruction and the "hidden curriculum
(Dreeben, 1968; Jackson, 1968; Overly, 1970; Apple, 1971 ; Apple &
King, 1977)," namely the unstated norms, values and beliefs that are
transmitted to students through the underlying structure of meaning
in both the formal content as well as the social relations of school and
classroom life (Giroux, forthcoming) . Most importantly, they will
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have to recognize the function of a hidden curriculum and its capacity
for undermining the goals of social education .
Social studies developers will have to shift their attention from a
technical, ahistorical, view of schooling to a socio-political perspec-
tive which focuses on the relationship between schooling and the idea
of justice. The goals of social education should be redefined and under-
stood as an extension of ethics directed toward "the arena of excel-
lence and responsibility where by acting together, men (and women)
can become truly free." (Stern and Yarbrough, 1978, p. 380) Thus,
social studies developers will have to answer anew the question : "What
is learned in school?" Fortunately, a few educators writing out of a
number of different theoretical traditions have already taken up the
challenge .
Traditions in Educational Theory
Three different traditions in educational theory have helped to il-
luminate the socializing role of schools and the meaning and struc-
ture of the hidden curriculum . They are 1) a structural-functional view
of schooling; 2) a phenomenological view characteristic of the "new"
sociology of education ; and 3) a radical critical view, often associated
with the neo-Marxist analysis of educational theory and practice .
Each of these views share distinctly different theoretical assumptions
concerning the meaning of knowledge, classroom social relationships,
and the political and cultural nature ofschooling. While we have based
our analysis of the hidden curriculum on assumptions and insights
drawn from all three traditions, we believe that the structural-func-
tional and phenomenological approaches suffer from serious deficien-
cies. The neo-Marxist position, it seems to us, provides the most in-
sightful and comprehensive model for a more progressive approach
for understanding the nature of schooling and developing an eman-
cipatory program for social education . Before examining the specific
contributions that these three traditions have made to the notion of
the hidden curriculum and the socializing role of schools, a general
overview of some of their basic assumptions will be provided .
The structural-functionalist approach has as one of its primary in-
terests how social norms and values are transmitted within the con-
text of the schools . Relying primarily upon a positivist sociological
model, this approach has highlighted how schools socialize students
to accept unquestionably a set of beliefs, rules, and dispositions as
fundamental to the functioning ofthe larger society. For the structural-
functionalists, the school provides a valuable service in training stu-
dents to uphold commitments and to learn skills required by society
(Parsons, 1959 ; Dreeben, 1968) . The value of this approach is three-
fold: 1) it makes clear that schools do not exist in precious isolation,
removed from the interests of the larger society; 2) it spells out specific
norms and structural properties of the hidden curriculum; and 3) it
raises questions about the specifically historical character of mean-
ing and social control in schools (Apple, 1977) .
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While insightful in many respects, the structural-functional model
is marred by a number of theoretical shortcomings which characterize
its basic assumptions . Rejecting the notion that growth develops from
conflict, it stresses consensus and stability rather than movement .
As a result, it downplays the notions of social conflict and competing
socio-economic interests . Moreover, it represents an apolitical posture
that sees as unproblematic the basic beliefs, values, and structural
socio-economic arrangements characteristic of American society (Kara-
bel and Halsey, 1977, p. 3). Consequently, the structural-functionalist
position defines students in reductionist behavioral terms as products
of socialization . By defining students as passive recipients, conflict
is explained mainly as a function of faulty socialization, the causes
of which usually lie in institutions outside of the classroom or school
or in the individual as deviant . As such, in the structural-functional
view the school appears to exist happily beyond the imperatives and
influence of class and power . Similarly, knowledge is appreciated for
its instrumental market value . Finally, in the structural-functional
model, students accept social conformity and lose the ability to make
meaning for themselves .
The social phenomenological approach to educational theory, often
called the new sociology, moves far beyond the structural-functionalist
position in its approach to the study of schooling . The new sociology
focuses critically on a number of assumptions about classroom inter-
actions and social encounters . For the new sociologists any valid theory
of socialization has to be seen as "a theory of the construction of social
reality, if not of a particular historical social order (O'Neill, 1973, p .
65)." They posit a model of socialization in which meaning is made
interactively. That is, meaning is "given" by situations but also created
by students as they interact in classrooms . Moreover, the social con-
struction of meaning by both teachers and students raises anew ques-
tions about the objective nature of knowledge itself. For the new soci-
ologists, the principles governing the organization, distribution, and
evaluation of knowledge are not absolute and objective ; instead, they
are socio-historical constructs forged by active human beings creat-
ing rather than simply existing in the world .
In this approach, the view of students as actors with a fixed identity
is replaced by a more dynamic model of student behavior . The new
sociologists focus on the participation of students in defining and re-
defining their worlds. Thus the focus of classroom studies with the
rise of the new sociology has shifted from an exclusive emphasis on
institutional behavior to a focus on students' interactions with lan-
guage, social relations, and categories of meaning. The proponents of
the new sociology have provided a new dimension to the study of the
relationship between socialization and the school curriculum (Young,
1971; Keddie, 1973; Jenks, 1977 ; Eggleston, 1977) . The new sociology
raises to a new level of discussion the relationship between the dis-
tribution of power and knowledge. It requires social studies curricu-
lum developers to make problematic many of the truisms that char-
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acterized the selection, organization, and distribution of knowledge
and pedagogical styles inherent in curriculum development. In one
sense, the new sociology has stripped the school curriculum of its
innocence .
But the new sociology is not without its flaws, flaws that under-
mine its ability to resolve the very problems it identified . The most
thoughtful critique lodged against the new sociology is that it repre-
sents a form of subjective idealism (Sharp and Greene, 1975 ; Sarup,
1978). Allegedly, at its core the new sociology lacks an adequate theory
of social change and consciousness . While it helps educators to uncover
the ways in which knowledge is defined and imposed, it fails to pro-
vide criteria for measuring the value of different forms of classroom
knowledge. By endorsing the value and relevance of students' in-
tentionality, the new sociology has succumbed to a notion of cultural
relativity. It lacks a theoretical construct to explain the role ideology
plays in the construction of knowledge by students . It fails to account
for the fact that the way students perceive the external world does
not always correspond to the actual structure and content of that world .
Subjective perceptions are dialectically related to the social world and
do not simply "mirror" it . To ignore this, as the new sociology pro-
ponents have, is to fall prey to a distorted subjectivism . Sharp and
Greene have captured this position cogently .
The social world is more than the mere constellations of meaning .
Although we can accept that the knowing subject acts in the world
on the basis of his understanding, that there is always a subjective
factor which enters into knowledge of the world, it does not follow
from this that the world possesses the character which the know-
ing subject bestows upon it, that the objects which we know in the
social world are mere subjective creations capable of being differ-
ently constituted in an infinite variety of ways. The phenomenolo-
gist appears to be putting forward what we could argue is an ex-
treme form of subjective idealism . Where the external objective
world is merely a constitution of the creative consciousness, the
subject-object dualism disappears in the triumph of the constitut-
ing subject. (Sharp and Greene, 1975, p. 21 .)
In the final analysis, the new sociology fails in spite of its desire
for radical change and fundamental egalitarianism . Its failure lies
in its inability to illuminate how social and political structures func-
tion to mask reality and promote ideological hegemony (Gramsci,
1971 ; Entwistle, 1978) . Thus, this position not only fails to explain
how different varieties of classroom meanings, knowledge, and ex-
periences arise, it also fails to explain how they are able to sustain
themselves . By focusing exclusively on the micro-level of schooling,
on studies of classroom interaction, the new sociology falls short of
illustrating how socio-political arrangements influence and constrain
individual and collective efforts to construct knowledge and mean-
ing. These arrangements probably play an important role in influenc-
ing the very texture of classroom life .
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A third position is a neo-Marxist approach to socialization and social
change. While this position is not without its own flaws, its value lies
in being able to move beyond the apolitical view of the functionalist
position as well as the subjective idealism of the new sociology . At the
core of the neo-Marxist approach is a recognition of the relationship
between economic and cultural reproduction . Moreover, inherent in
this perspective is an intersection of theory, ideology, and social prac-
tice. Schools are viewed in this approach as agents of ideological con-
trol which function to reproduce and to maintain dominant beliefs,
values, and norms . This is not meant to suggest that schools are merely
factories which process students and "mirror" the interests of the
larger society ; such a perspective is clearly mechanistic and reduc-
tionist (LaBrecque, 1978). The neo-Marxist position points out that
schools in corresponding ways are linked to the principles and pro-
cesses governing the workplace . The cutting edge of this perspective
is its insistence on connecting macro forces in the larger society to
micro analysis such as classroom studies .
The neo-Marxist approach more clearly than the other two ap-
proaches identified in this paper illuminates how social reproduction
is linked to classroom social relationships and how the construction
of knowledge is related to the notion of false consciousness . While
stressing the importance of a student's subjective role in constituting
meaning for himself, neo-Marxists are equally concerned with the
way in which social and economic conditions constrain and distort
social construction of meaning, particularly as mediated through the
hidden curriculum. Not only do classroom studies have to be linked
to the study of the larger society, they have to be connected to a notion
of justice, one that is capable of articulating how certain unjust social
structures can be identified and replaced.
School Knowledge and Classroom Relations
While the neo-Marxist perspective provides an important focus on
the ideological nature of the process of schooling and the larger social
order, it has done little to explicate in specific terms the kinds of knowl-
edge and classroom social relationships that have been used to repro-
duce the reified consciousness that maintains the cultural and eco-
nomic interests of a stratified society . This is where the structural
functionalists and new sociology adherents have made valuable con-
tributions to the study of curriculum and social education . By draw-
ing on the insights within a new Marxist framework, we can begin
to answer the fundamental question of "What is learned in schools?"
In response to the question, Robert Dreeben (1968) points out that
the student learns more than simply instructional knowledge and
skills, and that the traditional view of schooling as being "primarily
cognitive in nature is at best only partially tenable (Dreeben, 1968,
p. 24)." Stephen Arons reinforces this view by calling school "a social
environment from which a child may learn much more than what is
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in the formal curriculum (Arons, 1976, p . 98)." Implicit in this analysis
of the school and classroom as a socializing agent is an important
pedagogical premise. The premise is that any curriculum designed to
introduce positive changes in classrooms will fail, unless such a pro-
posal is rooted in an understanding of those socio-political forces that
strongly influence the very texture of day-to-day classroom pedagogi-
cal practices .
Since it is not entirely clear to social studies educators that schools
are indeed socio-political institutions, a case must first be made to
validate the position that schools are inextricably linked to other
social agencies and institutions within American society . Ralph Tyler
(1949) highlights the social function of schools by pointing out that
all educational philosophies are essentially an outgrowth of one of
two possible theoretical perspectives. He claims that a statement of
educational philosophy can be built upon one of the following ques-
tions: "Should the schools develop young people to fit into present
society as it is, or does the school have a revolutionary mission to de-
velop young people who will seek to improve the society (Tyler, 1949,
p . 35)?"
Tyler's point about educational philosophy is important for a num-
ber of reasons . First, it reinforces the notion that schools have a socio-
political function and cannot exist independently of the society in
which they operate. Second, Tyler recognizes that underlying every
educational program designed to intervene in the structure of the
schools there lies a theoretical frame of reference . Paulo Freire, the
Brazilian educator, argues both points in his claim that,
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process . Education
either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the
integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present
system and bring about conformity to it, or, it becomes the `practice
of freedom' - the means by which men and women deal critically
and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the
transformation of their world (Freire, 1973, p . 15) .
Whether they realize it or not, social studies educators work in the
service of one of the two positions outlined by Tyler (1949) and Freire
(1973) .
An examination of schooling and its sociological ties to the family
and the workplace can illuminate the social and political functions
of schools. While a number of sociologists convincingly point out that
schools no longer assume the role of a surrogate family, they do per-
form a socializing function that the social structure of the family can-
not satisfy. For instance, comparing the functions of the family to
those of the school, Robert Dreeben (1968) argues that the structural
properties of the family, while satisfying specific affective needs of
children, cannot adequately socialize them to function in the adult
world. According to him, schooling demands the formation of social
relationships that are more time-bounded, more diverse, less depen-
dent, and less emotive than those of the family. Unlike the family,
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schools separate performance from emotional expression, and per-
form what is considered their most explicit purpose, "Imparting the
skills, information, and beliefs each child will eventually need as an
adult member of society (Dreeben, 1968, p. 13) ."
He argues that schools do more than provide instruction. They pro-
vide norms, or principles of conduct, which are learned through the
varied social experiences in schools that influence students' lives .
Though Dreeben ignores the political nature of these social experi-
ences, he does mention four important norms that students learn : in-
dependence, achievement, universalism, and specificity .
Worth noting is Dreeben's failure to mention in specific ideologi-
cal terms the cultural values that support and give meaning to these
norms. Two examples will suffice . Independence is defined as "handling
tasks with which under different circumstances, one can rightfully
expect the help of others (Dreeben, 1968, p. 66) ." Achievement is de-
fined so as to assure pupils of the gratification of "winning and losing,"
and while not stated by Dreeben, justifies extrinsic rewards and the
notion that someone must always come in last.
That students learn more than cognitive skills is illuminated further
in Bernstein's analysis which brings into sharp focus some of the fea-
tures of the political nature of schooling . His analysis argues that
students learn values and norms that would produce "good" industrial
workers. Students internalize values which stress a respect for author-
ity, punctuality, cleanliness, docility, and conformity. What the stu-
dents learn from the formally sanctioned content of the curriculum
is much less important than what they learn from the ideological
assumptions embedded in the school's three message systems : the
system of curriculum ; the system of classroom pedagogical styles ;
and the system of evaluation (Bernstein, 1977) . In describing what
students learn from the school's hidden curriculum, Stanley Arono-
witz (1973) provides a capsule view of the socializing processes that
operate within these "message" systems :
Indeed, the child learns in school . . . The child learns that the
teacher is the authoritative person in the classroom, but that she
is subordinate to a principal . Thus the structure of society can be
learned through understanding the hierarchy of power within the
structure of the school. Similarly, the working class child learns
its role in society . On the side, school impresses students as a whole
with their powerlessness since they are without the knowledge re-
quired to become citizens and workers . On the other, the hierarchy
of occupations and classes is reproduced by the hierarchy of grade
levels and tracks within grades . Promotion to successive grades
is the reward for having mastered the approved political and social
behavior as well as the prescribed `cognitive' material . But within
grades, particularly in large urban schools, further distinctions
among students are made on the basis of imputed intelligence and
that in turn is determined by the probable ability of children to suc-
ceed in terms of standards set by the educational system (Arono-
witz, 1973, p . 75) .
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Writers such as Dreeben (1968) and Aronowitz (1973) have helped
to make it clear that the school functions as an agency of socializa-
tion within a network of larger institutions. Yet, with few exceptions,
the political role of the school and how that role affects educational
objectives, methods, content, and organizational structures has not
been adequately illuminated by social studies educators (Apple, 1971 ;
Giroux & Penna, 1977) .
While commenting on the consequences of ignoring the political
nature of education, Jerome Bruner (1973) candidly indicates that
educators can no longer strike a fictional posture of neutrality and
objectivity .
A theory of instruction is a political theory in the power sense that
it derives from consensus concerning the distribution of power within
the society - who shall be educated and to fulfill what roles? In the
very same sense, pedagogical theory must surely derive from a con-
ception of economics, for where there is a division of labor within
the society and an exchange of goods and services for wealth and
prestige, then how people are educated and in what number and
with what constraints on the use of resources are all relevant is-
sues . The psychologist or educator who formulates pedagogical
theory without regard to the political, economic, and social setting
of the educational process courts triviality and merits being ignored
in the community and in the classroom (Bruner, 1973, p . 115) .
As mentioned previously, a serious approach to social studies edu-
cational change would have to begin with an examination of the con-
tradictions that exist between the school's hidden curriculum and
official curriculum . Any approach to social studies curriculum devel-
opment that ignores the existence of the hidden curriculum runs the
risk of not only being incomplete, but also insignificant . For the heart
of the school's function is not to be found simply in the daily dispens-
ing of information by teachers, but also "in the social relations of the
educational encounter (Bowles & Gintis, 1976, p . 265) ."
School Curriculum Organization
But before any study of classroom social relations is put forth, it
must be made clear that the content of what is taught in social studies
classes plays a vital role in the political socialization of students . For
instance, studies by Apple (1971), Anyon (1978), and Popkewitz (1977),
have pointed out that what counts as "objective" knowledge in social
studies textbooks, in fact, often represents a one-sided and theoretically
distorted view of the subject under study . Knowledge is often accepted
as truth legitimizing a specific view of the world that is either ques-
tionable or patently false . The selection, organization, and distribu-
tion of social studies knowledge is hidden from the realm of ideology
(Apple, 1971; Popkewitz, 1977) . In addition to its overt and covert
messages, the way knowledge is selected and organized represents
a priori assumptions by the educator about its value and legitimacy .
In the final analysis, these are ideological considerations that struc-
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ture the students' perception of the world . If the fragile ideological
nature of these considerations are not made clear to students, then
they will learn more about social conformity than critical inquiry . To
break through the "hidden curriculum" of knowledge, social studies
educators must help students understand that knowledge is not only
variable and linked to human interest but also must be examined in
regards to its claims to validity . Popkewitz has succinctly focused in
on this issue for social studies educators with his claim .
Constructing curriculum requires that educators give attention
to the social disciplines as a human product whose meanings are
transmitted in social processes. Instruction should give serious at-
tention to the conflicting views of the world these crafts generate,
the social location and the social contexts of inquiry . To plan for
children's study of ideas, educators are compelled to inquire into
the nature and character of the discourse found in history, sociology,
or anthropology. What problems does each deal with? What modes
of thought exist? What are its paradigmatic tasks? What limitations
are placed on the knowledge of their findings? Instruction should
be concerned with the different perspectives of phenomena that are
within each discipline and how these men and women come to know
what they know (Popkewitz, 1977, p . 58) .
Moreover, it follows that equal weight must be given in any analy-
sis of the hidden curriculum to the organizational structures that in-
fluence and govern teacher-student interactions within the classroom .
For these suggest an ideological character that is no less compelling
than curriculum content in the socialization process at work in the
classroom encounter. Though distinctly apolitical in nature, Philip
Jackson's (1968) work represents one of the more sophisticated at-
tempts to analyze the social processes that give shape to another di-
mension of the hidden curriculum. Unlike the official curriculum,
with its stated cognitive and affective objectives, the hidden curricu-
lum in this case is rooted in those organizational aspects of classroom
life which are not commonly perceived by either students or teachers .
According to Jackson, elements of the hidden curriculum are shaped
by three key analytical concepts : crowds, praise, and power .
In short, working in classrooms means learning to live in crowds .
Coupled with the prevailing values of the educational system, this
has profound implications for the social education established in the
schools. Equally significant is the fact that schools are evaluative
settings, and what a student learns is not only how to be evaluated,
but how to evaluate himself and others as well. Finally, schools are
marked by a basic, concrete division between the powerful (teachers)
and the powerless (students) . As Jackson (1968) points out, what this
means "in three major ways, then - as members of crowds, as poten-
tial recipients of praise or reproof, and as pawns of institutional
authorities - students are confronted with aspects of reality that at
least during their childhood years are relatively confined to the hours
spent in the classroom (Jackson, 1968, p . 16) ."
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In more specific terms, especially those that highlight student-
teacher interactions, Jackson's analysis of the hidden curriculum
proves to be particularly instructive. Learning to live in crowds af-
fects students in a number of important ways. Students have to learn
constantly to wait to use resources, with the ultimate outcome being
that they learn to postpone or give up desires . In spite of the constant
interruptions in the classroom, students have to learn to be quiet .
Though students work in groups with other people whom they even-
tually get to know, they have to learn how to be isolated in a crowd .
For Jackson, the quintessential virtue learned by students under these
conditions is patience (i .e ., not a patience rooted in mediated restraint,
but one that is rooted in an unwarranted submission to authority) .
"They must also, to some extent, learn to suffer in silence . They are
expected to bear with equanimity, in other words, the continued de-
lay, denial and interruption of their personal wishes and desires
(Jackson, 1968, p . 18) ."
Praise and power in the classroom are inextricably connected to
one another. While students may find themselves in a position oc-
casionally in which they can evaluate each other, the unquestioned
source of praise and reproof is the teacher. Though the administra-
tion of positive and negative sanctions is the teacher's most visible
symbol of power, the real significance of his or her role lies in the net-
work of social relationships and values that are reproduced with the
use of that authority. The nature of the hidden curriculum is nowhere
more clearly revealed than in the system of evaluation . The potential
effect of evaluation comes into sharp focus where one recognizes that
what is taught and evaluated in the classroom is both academic and
nonacademic, and includes in the latter institutional adjustment and
specific personal qualities .
In fact, some notable studies have been made that support the above
hypothesis, Bowles and Gintis (1976), after reviewing a number of
studies that link personality traits, attitudes, and behavioral at-
tributes to school grades, reached the following conclusions :
Students are rewarded for exhibiting discipline, subordinacy, in-
tellectually as opposed to emotionally oriented behavior, and hard
work independent from intrinsic task motivation . Moreover, these
traits are rewarded independently of any effect of `proper demeanor'
on scholastic achievement (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p . 40) .
In addition, they point out that students who are rated high in
citizenship (i .e., conformity to the social order of the school), also
rated "significantly below average on measures of creativity and men-
tal flexibility (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p . 41) ." Viewed from the stu-
dent's perspective, the classroom becomes a miniature workplace in
which time, space, content, and structure are fixed by others. Rewards
are extrinsic, and all social interaction between teachers and stu-
dents are mediated by hierarchically organized structures . The under-
lying message, learned in this context points less to schools . . . helping
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students to think critically about the world in which they live, than
it does to schools acting as agents of social control .
Teachers obviously play a vital role in maintaining the structure
of schools and transmitting the values needed to support the larger
social order (Keddie, 1971; Sharp and Greene, 1975) . Lortie's (1975)
study of teachers indicates that they generally are unable to offset
the conservative pedagogical influences accepted by them during their
pre-college and college schooling. He also claims that "recruitment
resources foster a conservative outlook among entrants . . . they ap-
peal strongly to young people who are favorably disposed toward the
existing system of schools (Lortie, 1975, p . 54) ." Lortie's study also
found that one of the most severe shortcomings of teachers was their
subjective, idiosyncratic approach to teaching . Lacking a thought-
out theoretical framework from which to develop a methodology and
content, teachers lacked significant criteria to shape, guide, or evalu-
ate their own work. But more importantly, they pass their distrust
of theory on to their students and help in perpetuating intellectual
passivity .
As mentioned before, at the heart of the social educational en-
counter is a hidden curriculum whose values shape and influence
practically every aspect of the student's educational experience . But
this should not suggest that the hidden curriculum is so powerful
that there is little hope for educational reform. Instead, the hidden
curriculum should be seen not as an impassable boundary, but as
providing a possible direction for focusing educational change . For
instance, while social studies developers alone cannot eliminate the
hidden curriculum, they can identify its organizational structure and
the political assumptions upon which it rests . By doing so, they can
develop a pedagogy, curriculum materials, and classroom structural
properties which offset the most undemocratic features of the tradi-
tional hidden curriculum. In doing so, a first but significant step will
be made to help teachers and students reach beyond the classroom
experience and tentatively move toward changing those institutional
arrangements .
Democratic Conditions and Collection Action
Before changes in social education and in social studies develop-
ment can be undertaken, however, social studies educators will have
to develop very specific classroom processes designed to promote
values and beliefs which encourage democratic, critical modes of
student-teacher participation and interaction . That the traditional
hidden curriculum of schooling is inimical to the stated aims of the
official curriculum, is a fact that no longer escapes astute social analy-
sis (Illich, 1973 ; Bernstein, 1976) . Instead of preparing students to
enter the society with skills that will allow them to reflect critically
upon and intervene in the world in order to change it, schools act as
conservative forces which, for the most part, socialize students to
conform to the status quo. The structure, organization and content
of contemporary schooling serve to equip students with the personality
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requisites desired in the bureaucratically structured, hierarchically
organized work force. As Philip Jackson (1968) has pointed out :
So far as their power structure is concerned, classrooms are not
too dissimilar from factories and offices, those ubiquitous organiza-
tions in which so many of our adult life is spent . Thus, schools might
really be called a preparation for life, but, not in the usual sense
in which educators employ that term (Jackson, 1968, p . 33) .
The remaining section of this paper will identify an alternative
set of values and classroom social processes. In our view, these alter-
natives represent a basis for formulating a collectivist and democratic
social education, stripped of egoistic individualism and alienating
social relationships. These values and processes should be used by
social studies educators in developing a content and pedagogy which
link theory and practice and restore to students and teachers an aware-
ness of the social and personal importance of active participation and
critical thinking . While the values will be enumerated at the outset,
the classroom processes will be illuminated through an analysis of
the specific features that in our judgment should characterize social
education .
The values and social processes which provide the theoretical under-
pinning for social education include developing in students a respect
for moral commitment, group solidarity and social responsibility . In
addition, a non-authoritarian individualism should be fostered, one
that maintains a balance with group cooperation and social aware-
ness. Every effort should be made to give students an awareness of
the necessity of developing choices of their own, and to act on those
choices with an understanding of situational constraints . The educa-
tional process itself will be open to examination in relation to its links
to the larger society .
Students should experience social studies as an apprenticeship in
the milieu of social action, or as Freire (1978) has stated, students
should be taught the practice of thinking about practice . One way of
doing this is to view and evaluate each learning experience, when-
ever possible, with respect to its connections with the larger social-
economic totality. Moreover, it is important that students not only
think about both the content and practice of critical communication
but recognizeas well the importance of translating the outcome of
these experiences into concrete action . For example, it is folly in our
view to engage students in topics of political and social inequality in
the classroom and in the larger political world and to ignore the reali-
ties and pernicious effects of economic and income inequality on the
quality of life of substantial numbers of people in schools, communi-
ties, and nations . Even when linkage to the larger reality is made,
a failure to address and to implement the practical will not provide
students with the learning implied in Freire's appeal. In other words,
it is important that social studies educators provide students with the
opportunity to grasp the dynamic dialectic between critical conscious-
ness and social action . There is a need then to integrate critical aware-
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ness, social processes, and social practice in such a way that what is
made clear to students is not simply how the forces of social control
work but also how they can be overcome . Students should be able to
recognize the truth value of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach
" . . . the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various
ways; the point is, to change it." (Arthur, 1972)
Many liberal social studies educators accept these values and social
processes and attempt to develop content-based curriculum which
translates them into practice . But, in effect, liberals strip these values
and social processes of their radical content by situating them within
the framework of social adjustment rather than social and political
emancipation . The liberal philosophic stance with its emphasis on
progress through social melioration, the value of meritocracy and
the professional expert, and the viability of a mass education system
dedicated to serving the needs of the industrial order fails to penetrate
and utilize the radical cutting edge of the values and social processes
we support. Elizabeth Cagan captures the contradiction between
liberal thought and radical values and social practices in her comment :
While liberal reformers intend to use education to promote equal-
ity, community, and humanistic social interaction, they do not
confront those aspects of the schools which pull in the opposite
direction. Their blindness to these contradictions may stem from
their class position: as middle-class reformers they are unwilling
to advocate the kind of egalitarianism which is necessary for a true
human community. Reforms in pedagogical technique have been in-
stituted, but the . . . (hidden curriculum) . . . remain(s) in effect .
This hidden curriculum promotes competitiveness, individualism,
and authoritarianism (Cagan, 1978, p . 261) .
The social processes of most classrooms militate against students
developing a sense of community . As in the larger societal order, com-
petition and individual striving are at the core of American school-
ing. In ideological terms, collectivity and social solidarity represent
powerful structural threats to the ethos of capitalism . This ethos is
built not only upon the atomization and division of labor but the frag-
mentation of consciousness and social relationships (Braverman, 1974 ;
Ewen, 1976). Whatever virtues about collectivity that are brought
to the public's attention exist solely in form and not in substance .
Both in and out of schools, self-interest represents the criterion for
acting on and entering into social relationships . The structure of
schooling reproduces the ethos of privatization and the moral posture
of selfishness at almost every level of the formal and hidden curricula .
Whether gently supporting the philosophy of "do your own thing" or
maintaining pedagogical structures which undermine collective ac-
tion, the message coming from most classrooms is one that enshrines
the self at the expense of the group . The hidden message is one that
supports alienation (Slater, 1970 ; Cagan, 1978) .
The classroom scenario that fosters this unbridled notion of in-
dividualism is a familiar one . Students traditionally sit in rows star-
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ing at the back of each others' heads and at the teacher who faces
them in symbolic, authoritarian fashion, or in a large semi-circle
with teacher and student space ~ rigidly proscribed . Events in the
classroom are governed by a rigid time schedule imposed by a system
of bells and reinforced by cues from teachers while the class is in
session. Instruction and, hopefully, some formal learning usually
begins and ends because it is the correct predetermined time, not
because a cognitive process has been stimulated into action .
Implementation
A number of social processes help to undermine the authoritarian
effects of the hidden curriculum in the classroom . Our terminology
will be familiar to all social studies developers, liberals among them
will espouse the immediate instructional goals, but only reconstruc-
tionists will accept the long range implications of these processes for
life in classrooms, schools, and larger social/political institutions .
The pedagogical foundation for democratic processes in the class-
room can be established by eliminating the pernicious practice of
"tracking" students . This tradition in schools of grouping students
according to "abilities" and perceived performance is of dubious in-
structional value . The justification for this practice is based on tradi-
tional genetic theories which have been systematically refuted on
intellectual and ethical grounds (Daniels, 1973 ; Berger, 1978; Biggs,
1978). A more heterogeneous class provides a better opportunity for
flexibility to be manifested . For instance, in the heterogeneous class-
setting, students who qualitatively perform faster than other stu-
dents could be given the opportunity to function as peers acting as
individual or group leaders for other students . In such a situation,
students can act collectively in the process of learning and teaching .
As such, knowledge becomes the vehicle for dialogue and analysis
as well as the basis for new classroom social relationships . Moreover,
not only are more progressive social relationships developed in this
context, but traditional notions of learning and achievement are now
made problematic . It must be stressed that social education should
be based on a notion of achievement that is at odds with traditional
genetic theories of intelligence which serve as the theoretical base
to support tracking .
With the elimination of tracking, power is further diffused in a
classroom so individuals in both peer and group-leadership roles are
able to assume leadership positions formerly reserved for the teacher
alone . In other words, with the breakdown of rigid, hierarchical roles
and rules, which Basil Bernstein has called strong framing, both stu-
dents and teachers can explore democratic relationships rarely de-
veloped in the traditional classroom (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 88-89) .
These new relationships will also allow teachers to set the ground-
work for breaking down the cellular structure exposed by Dan Lor-
tie's study. The cellular structure refers to the failure of teachers to
mutually adapt their task and actions . Most teachers do not share
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pedagogical strategies ; and thus, they lack any cohesiveness in their
professional interpersonal relationships (Lortie, 1975) . By sharing
their power and roles, teachers will be in a better position to break
through the provincialism and narrow socialization that prevents
them from sharing and examining their theory and practice of peda-
gogy with both students and colleagues .
Another important change that such courses should perpetuate
centers around the issue of authority and grades . Extrinsic rewards
should be minimized whenever possible, and students should be given
the opportunity to experience roles that will enable them to direct
the learning process, independently of the behavior usually associ-
ated with an emphasis on grades as rewards. Social relationships in
the traditional classroom are based upon power relations inextricably
linked to the teacher's allotment and distribution of grades . Grades
become in many cases the ultimate discipline instruments by which
the teacher imposes his desired values, behavior patterns and beliefs
upon students (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Dialogical grading elimi-
nates this pernicious practice since it allows students to gain some
control over the distribution of grades and thereby weakens the tra-
ditional correspondence between grades and authority . We refer to
such grading as dialogical because it involves a dialogue between
students and teachers over the criteria, function, and consequences
of the system of evaluation. The use of , the term is in fact an exten-
sion of Freire's emphasis on the role of dialogue in clarifying and
democratizing social relationships (Freire, 1973) .
While opportunities for dialogue with teachers and peers should
be encouraged, they are not conducive to large group settings . In
small groups, students should evaluate and test the logic in each
other's work. The importance of group work to social education rests
on a number of crucial assumptions. Group work represents one of
the most effective ways to demystify the traditional, manipulative
role of the teacher ; moreover, it provides students with social con-
texts which stress social responsibility and group solidarity .
Group interaction provides students with the experiences that they
need in order to realize that they can learn from one another . Only
by diffusing authority along horizontal lines will students be able to
share and appreciate the importance of learning collectively . Crucial
to such a process is the element of dialogue. Through group dialogue,
the norms of cooperation and sociability offset the traditional hidden
curriculum's emphasis on competition and excessive individualism .
In addition, the process of group instruction provides students with
the opportunity for experiencing, rather than simply hearing about,
the dynamics of participatory democracy .
In short, developing an awareness that is nurtured in a shared
task to democratize classroom relationships is imperative for stu-
dents if they are to overcome the lack of community reminiscent of
the traditional classroom and the larger social order. The group en-
counter provides the social basis for the development of such a con-
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sciousness . Under such conditions, social relations of education marked
by dominance, subordination, and an uncritical respect for authority
can be effectively minimized .
Social relations marked by reciprocity and communality are not
the only by-products of the group component . Another important
feature centers around giving students the opportunity to serve an
apprenticeship in teaching. By evaluating each other's work, acting
as peer-leaders, participating in and leading discussions, students
learn that teaching is not based on intuitive and imitiative pedagogi-
cal approaches . Instead, by establishing a close working relationship
with teachers and peers, students are given the chance to under-
stand that an analytical, codified body of experience is the central
element in any pedagogy . This helps both students and teachers to
recognize that behind any pedagogy are values, beliefs, and assump-
tions informed by a particular world-view. Most students see teach-
ing in terms of individual personalities rather than the result of a
thought out set of socially constructed pedagogical axioms (Lortie,
1975) . By using this course of action, both students and teachers are
provided with a "particular" framework for teaching that highlights
the theoretical underpinnings of classroom pedagogy .
The concept of time in schools restricts the development of healthy
social and intellectual relationships among students and teachers .
Reminiscent of life in factories with its production schedules and
hierarchial work relationships, the daily routine of most classrooms
acts as a brake upon participation and democratic processes . Modi-
fied self-pacing is a classroom process that is more compatible with
the view that aptitude is the amount of time required by the students
to develop a critical comprehension and resolution of the task under
study .
It is imperative that students be given the opportunity to work
alone and in groups at a comfortable learning pace so as to be able
to quickly develop a learning style that enables them to move beyond
the fragmented and atheoretical pedagogies that now characterize
American education (Aronowitz, 1977) . The flexible use of a mode of
self-paced learning should eliminate these practices .
Self pacing is important for other reasons . The delay and denial
characteristic of most conventional classrooms can be offset by free-
ing teachers and students to respond to each other almost immedi-
ately. Students need not wait to get feedback and communication
about their work . This militates against students giving up or post-
poning their desire to learn or to share and analyze what they have
learned with other students . Modified self-pacing allows students
to work alone or with other students at a comfortable pace, within
reasonable bounds mutually agreed upon by teachers and students .
Under this format, the clock ceases to shape the pace and character
of the class, and the tyranny of a rigid time schedule gives way to a
schedule governed by reciprocal exchanges . Moreover, since students
have a measure of control over their work, grades, and time, this
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eliminates pitting students against one another and reinforces the
notion that learning is essentially a shared phenomenon .
In political terms, the self-pacing and peer leader features inveigh
against the myth of considering the teacher as the indispensible ex-
pert, alone qualified to define and distribute knowledge (Illich, 1971) .
Moreover, with the use of peers and modified self-pacing, democratic
classroom relationships are developed and the one-dimensionality of
traditional classroom social relationships gives way to the possibility
of infinitely richer classroom social encounters . These classroom
social encounters are reciprocally humanizing and are mediated
through an emancipatory conceptual framework .
The peer leader and self-paced features represent two social pro-
cesses that significantly offset some of the organizational and struc-
tural properties of the traditional classroom . In most traditional
classrooms, students work in an isolated and independent fashion .
This is usually rationalized by educators on the grounds that it fos-
ters independence . In part, this is true, but it fosters a type of inde-
pendence that precludes the development of social relationships
among age peers and adults that promote opportunities to share and
work in an interdependent fashion . Moreover, its function appears
to be more ideological than rational, and represents a strong peda-
gogical component in upholding the division of labor characteristic
of the larger society . In any case, the traditional notion of indepen-
dence does not strike a balance between developing one's specific
talents and sharing tasks with other students . The self-paced and
peer features smoothly reconcile this contradiction . Students not
only are given ample opportunity to explore their talents and in-
terests at a pace they can control, they also can share their interests
with other people . They get help from both the classroom leaders and
from their peers .
Conclusion
This paper provides the groundwork for a new thrust in the task
of identifying the dynamics and ideological assumptions underlying
specific patterns of socialization in social studies classrooms . By iden-
tifying the social processes of classroom and school life which make
these patterns operative and highlighting the normative nature of
social studies knowledge, it attempts to clarify the dichotomy be-
tween the goals of social studies developers and the process of school-
ing. In our judgment, the recognition of this dichotomy between the
official and hidden curriculum will compel social studies educators
to develop a new theoretical perspective about the dynamics of edu-
cational change, one that penetrates the functional relationships
that exist between the institutions of the schools, the workplace and
the political world . In so doing, they will begin to uncover those social
processes in all socio-political institutions including the classroom
which militate against the creation of a democratic, social education .
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Further enumeration and elucidation of those processes as well as
the search for interconnections among them will become the neces-
sary prerequisites for educators planning to intervene into the edu-
cational process .
For the message is a clear one . Social studies educators will run
the risk of repeated failure unless they develop a structural founda-
tion that will counter the social processes and values of the hidden
curriculum . If social solidarity, individual growth, and dedication to
social action are to emerge from social education, the hidden curricu-
lum will have to be either eliminated or minimized as much as pos-
sible. There is little room in social education for tracking and social
sorting, hierarchical social relationships, the correspondence be-
tween evaluation and power, and the fragmented and isolated inter-
personal dynamics of the classroom encounter, all of which charac-
terize the hidden curriculum. These classroom processes will have to
be replaced by democratic social processes and values which take
into consideration the reciprocal interaction of goals, pedagogy, con-
tent, and structure .
The above task will not be an easy one; the changes to be made
will be difficult and often frustrating but nonetheless necessary . Edu-
cational reformers can no longer operate within the limited confines
of traditional educational theory and practice . It should be clear that
social education is normative and political in essence, and at its best
can be both emancipatory and reflective. By stepping outside the
traditional parameters of educational theory and practice, we can
view schooling as inextricably linked to a web of larger socio-economic
and political arrangements . And by analyzing the nature of the re-
lationship between schools and the dominant society in political and
normative terms we can counter a hidden curriculum defined through
the ideology of traditional classroom social processes . If social educa-
tion is in Kant's words to be used to educate students for a better
society, social studies educators will even have to go further than
democratizing their schools and classrooms. They will have to do
more than help develop changes in student consciousness ; they will
have to help implement the rationale for reconstructing a new social
order whose institutional arrangements, in the final analysis, will
provide the basis for a truly humanizing education .
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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SOCIALIZATION IN
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SOCIAL STUDIES TEXTBOOKS:
A REACTION
James P. Shaver
Utah State University
In a recent article, Jean Anyon (1978) argued that "the unrealistic
nature of social studies texts has a social function . . . to foster in
students an acceptance of the legitimacy of on-going social institu-
tions . . . " as "part of the overall process of socialization which occurs
in schools" (p . 40). She pointed to "the powerful nexus of social forces
in which schools operate" and suggested that "knowledge which
`counts' as social studies knowledge will tend to be that knowledge
which provides formal justification for, and legitimation of, prevail-
ing institutional arrangements, and forms of conduct and beliefs"
(p . 40). Anyon illustrated her arguments by reference to analyses
of social studies textbooks by herself and others .
The major thrust of Anyon's article is well-taken . In fact, recent
evidence (Stake & Easley, 1978 . Ch. 12, 16) indicates that socialization
is not foisted on unwilling teachers by textbooks authors and pub-
lishers. Teachers - secondary as well as elementary ; science and
mathematics as well as social studies - accept the socialization func-
tion of prompting "American values" . Not only are elementary social
studies textbooks slanted to promote a positive view of American his-
tory and our government, but secondary school studies teachers use
textbook content for that end, too .
The socialization efforts of teachers fit the sociological and anthro-
pological view that the transmission and perpetuation of the society's
values is an inevitable part of the school's role. Whether consciously
or intuitively, teachers seem to sense that such socialization is, along
with the teaching of formal school subjects, part of society's mandate
to its formal educational institution . In contrast, the social studies "in-
telligensia" - the university professors and others who attempt to
provide intellectual leadership for the field - have tended to ignore
or reject teachers' socialization goals, treating efforts to accomplish
them as, at best, a necessary evil . The "leadership" bias has been,
instead, toward critical thinking and inquiry - an orientation which,
of course, implies another socialization agenda . That discrepancy in
point of view, along with others, has affected adversely the capacity
of professors and curriculum developers, even school supervisory
personnel, to assist social studies teachers in their efforts to improve
instruction. It may even in part account for the low level of use of the
Theory and Research in Social Education,, Vol . VII, No . 1, Spring 1979
by College and University Faculty Assembly of the National Coun-
cil for the Social Studies .
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reform - oriented New Social Studies materials of the 1960s (Shaver,
Davis & Helburn, 1978) . Moreover, a utopian view of social studies
that does not take into account the legitimate nonrational citizenship
education duties of the school has provided a dysfunctional basis for
research aimed at influencing practice in social studies education
(Shaver, 1978) .
The Meaning and Use of "Mindlessness"
Unfortunately, Anyon's discussion of the socialization role of ele-
mentary social studies textbooks is diluted by her misinterpretation
and misapplication of the notion of "mindlessness" in education .
Anyon (p. 40) alluded to my use of the term "mindlessness" in my
National Council for the Social Studies presidential address (Shaver,
1977) . And, she indicated, incorrectly, that I argued "that such unfortu-
nate aspects of the social studies (as the "overly positive view of the
benevolence and accountability of political authority" presented in
elementary social studies texts) can be traced to `mindlessness" and
a lack of attention to educational thought and practice" . She goes on
to say :
In Shaver's view, the unrealistic nature of elementary social studies
textbooks would illustrate thoughtlessness and failure : The books
"fail" to provide students with the tools for critical thought or in-
formed participation in democratic society - the books are, in other
words, somewhat dysfunctional . (p 40)
I did not refer to elementary social studies textbooks in the presidential
address. Moreover, Anyon's comments about that address, as well as
other parts of her article, indicate a lack of understanding of "mind-
lessness" as used there .
"Mindlessness" as I defined it (p . 30, relying on Silberman, 1970, to
whom Anyon also refers), involves the thoughtless use of method
and/or content without examination of the underlying assumptions
and the potential outcomes that may impact the achievement of one's
purposes. The concept of mindlessness, therefore, does not speak to
the validity of any particular educational practice, but to the existence
or nonexistence of rational justification for the practice . The "mind-
lessness" question, for example, is not whether social studies texts
present an "overly positive" view of American political and economic
institutions, but whether that presentation has been carefully justified
by the authors and publishers of the texts and by the teachers who
teach from them . Of course, the existence of a logically sound rationale
for an educational practice, such as using textbooks geared toward
socialization, does not assure that everyone will agree with the prac-
tice. Legitimate differences in empirical, value, and logical assump-
tions can lead to divergent educational positions, none of which is
necessarily mindless .
A lack of understanding that mindlessness refers to a process rather
than to a product is indicated by Anyon's summary of her article ;
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The view that has been expressed here is that the alleged naivete,
the lack of "realism" and the overly positive loading to social studies
textbooks should not be traced to "mindlessness" or lack of critical
attention . (p. 50)
Moreover, her article does not provide the basis for such a summary
claim. Anyon has presented a persuasive argument that elementary
studies textbooks do emphasize socialization, in the sense of acceptance
of societal institutions at the expense of dissent and critical participa-
tion. However, she failed to deal with or explain the reasons for this
emphasis in terms of the decision-making processes of the textbooks
authors and publishers and the teachers who use the books .
She seems to accept some implicitly legitimate societal imperative
for the use of social studies textbooks as socialization tools . For in-
stance, at one point, after noting that "there is no inherent reason,
for example, why writing letters to the editor is - by itself - more
`logical' than putting up wall posters" and then making the same
point about monogamy and individual ownership of property, she noted :
For this reason prevailing practices of the social institutions must
be integrated into a cognitive whole, and given justification . And,
like patriotism, the sense of the acceptability of prevailing institu-
tional practices must be fostered in the young and maintained
in adults. Such attitudes and beliefs must be developed over time .
(p . 42 . Italics mine .)
And, at another point, she suggests
that social studies knowledge is part of the larger social process
whereby U.S. institutions are legitimated - whereby prevailing
arrangements and forms of social participation are provided cog-
nitive meaning and normative status . The social function of the
texts is not, as is often argued by educators, to provide an arena
for the development of critical thought on social matters, but to
foster an acceptance of the legitimacy of prevailing institutions .
Thus, the texts may be expected to take an evaluative stance, and
to avoid the inclusion of material that might "tarnish" the image
of political or economic arrangements . (p. 50 . Italics hers .)
Such comments, which seem to rest on the unthinking acceptance
of some implied injunction, shed no light on whether the development
and use of social studies textbooks are mindless . The questions to
be asked to get at that are, for example, Is the orientation of the text-
books a conscious, rationally justified one? Are the teachers who use
the texts aware of the socialization orientation and have they explicated
and examined the assumptions underlying their use of the materials?
If the answers to such questions are positive, then the orientation
and use of the textbooks may be subject to dispute by persons who make
different assumptions or who challenge the logic of the authors, pub-
lishers, or teachers, but mindlessness would not be the charge . If, on the
contrary, the texts are written, published, and used in the classroom
without attention to educational purpose and to their potential effects
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on purpose, mindlessness prevails - regardless of the social utility
that someone else may be able to discern in the textbooks . Again,
mindlessness speaks to a process of justification, not to the outcome .
Similar curricula or instructional methods may be mindless or care-
fully justified .
Do the Texts Reflect Mindlessness?
Despite her statement that "the alleged naivete, the lack of `realism'
and the overly positive loading to social studies textbooks should not
be traced to `mindlessness or lack of critical attention" (p . 50), Anyon
seems to believe otherwise. After pointing out that the textbooks
are "highly `politicized' ", with the information in them "selected
from a store of socially available knowledge and points of view" (p . 51),
Anyon noted that one implication of such selection is that
the textbook content expresses a point of view that may unwitting-
ly (italics mine) favor the interests of certain social groups and
hinder the interests of other groups . . . give tacit approval to the
arrangements of power (italics hers) . . . (that) in turn legitimates
the activities of the powerful groups . . ., give tacit approval and
legitimation to the decision-making activities of those who have
power . . ., tacitly withhold approval from those who might benefit
from a change in the distribution of decision-making power . (p . 51)
A second implication, according to Anyon, is
that the textbook content may tacitly sanction an attitude of social
quiesence (italics hers) . . . (with disagreement channeled)
into "safe" political behaviors . (p . 51)
And, she said :
I (Anyon) would argue that an unintended consequence (italics
mine) of this attitude is the sanction of the position of suffering of
those in society who do not share equally in the distribution of politi-
cal and economic power. (p . 51)
Anyon does not make clear her meaning for the word "tacit", but
in the context of other words such as "unwittingly" and "unintended,"
the overall impression conveyed is not only that the textbooks are
silent about the implications she notes, but that there is a lack of
thought about these implications as well. This interpretation is con-
firmed by her assertion that her analysis of "what `counts' as school
knowledge" indicates that, in reality, the school "operates within
a set of social forces and political and economic interests which may
provide everyday educational knowledge and practice with unin-
tended meanings and possible consequences" (pp. 51-2 . (Italics
mine.) The intimation is that the "unintended meanings and possible
consequences" have not been addressed in the preparation and/or use
of the textbooks .
All of this sounds very much like a condemnation for mindlessness -
lack of thought about " . . . purpose, and about the ways in which tech-
niques, content, and organization fulfill or alter purpose" (Silberman,
1970, p. 379) . Indeed, Anyon's call for further analyses such as hers
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because of the possible consequences of the socialization orientation
of textbooks "for those in society who do not (italics hers) have power"
(p . 52) also suggests strongly that she believes the textbooks are inade-
quately justified . So does her suggestion that
an important task for educational researchers ought to be to investi-
gate school curriculum, pedagogy and pupil evaluation with the
intention of illuminating the social ties and explicating possible
meanings . (p . 52)
In contradiction to her own claim, Anyon seems to argue that the
positive orientations of elementary social studies textbooks toward
our nation's institutions are mindless in nature .
Conclusion
Anyon's emphasis on the socialization role of the school, and of text-
books in particular, is certainly important. Social studies leaders have
too long developed curricula and proposed teaching methods based
on an idealistic view of rational societal decision-making . At the same
time, I regret her confused and potentially confusing use of the concept
of mindlessness, and her apparent misunderstanding of my use of the
term .
In a final sentence Anyon commented, "educators cannot rely on
explanations which attribute school problems to professional `mind-
lessness" (p. 52) . This statement appears to be a linkage back to her
introductory remarks about my NCSS presidential address, and I
wonder what she means by "rely on explanations" . Certainly, the
point of my address was not to explain, in the sense of providing a
final answer . It was, I thought rather clearly, to urge social studies
educators toward greater analysis, including attention to the non-
rational components of citizenship education . It is important for
social studies educators to recognize that the schools have funda-
mental socialization functions that are often, but no always, conducted
mindlessly, and that part of the mindlessness of the profession is the
failure on the part of social studies leaders to consider the legitimacy
of that socialization role and to reflect - as Anyon's article can help
us to do - on the morally warranted directions, extent, and means
of socialization .
The contradiction between the democratic commitment to citizen
rationality and influence, on the one hand, and the need for nonrational
commitments as basis for societal cohesion and tranquility (as well as
for rationality itself, Weisskopf, 1978, p . 41), on the other, has not
been addressed adequately by those who produce and write textbooks,
or by those who write about the purposes and methods of social studies
education. Anyon's article takes us a step in the direction of facing
such fundamental questions . Hopefully, her confused use of the concept
of mindlessness will not dilute her important message . Socialization
is a legitimate societal expectation of the schools, but the possible
negative consequences of instilling some beliefs and attitudes must be
considered seriously.
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EDUCATION, SOCIAL STRUCTURE' AND THE
POWER OF INDIVIDUALS
Jean Anyon
Rutgers University
In the opening paragraphs of an article in which I argue that posi-
tively slanted social studies knowledge is an example of educational
legitimation of prevailing political and economic arrangements, I
refer to the concept of educator `mindlessness,' or lack of critical
thought (Anyon, 1978) . I suggest that this concept does not represent
a productive point of view from which to discuss educational matters
such as unrealistic social studies knowledge . I argue that I will adopt
a more socially explanatory framework . In a response to that article,
James Shaver (Shaver, 1979) states that the strength of my argument
is unfortunately "diluted" by an apparent "misinterpretation" of the
term mindlessness (Shaver, 1979, p. 2). While my reference to the
term mindlessness was primarily a stylistic device with which to
begin the discussion, Shaver's point is interesting, and somewhat
suggestive. That is, his remark hints at a problematic that I may have
assumed by the choice of mindlessness as a straw issue but did not
state or make explicit in the paper. That problematic is the relative
contribution of individuals, and of social `structures,' to the form and
content of education in society .
In the brief essay that follows, I propose to clarify the premises of
my original argument, to describe a social assumption that appears
to me to be embedded in the concept of educator "mindlessness," and
to identify the utility and limitations of both views .
Social Structure
It is often argued that schools are agencies of socialization . I believe
that this is true of formal educational institutions in all societies .
The point is rather obvious, however, and can be made in order to
introduce a more interesting argument : What is important about
school socialization is what school practices and assumptions it en-
tails, and, conversely, what those school assumptions and practices
reveal about the society in which the schools are embedded . Thus, in
my analysis of the political and economic content of elementary social
studies textbooks I identified textbook statements used to define and
describe U.S . political and economic institutions ; I then attempted
to show, by an analysis of what was emphasized, missing and distorted
in these statements that the textbook definitions were not socially
`neutral,' but were rationalizations and justifications of prevailing
arrangements of power and distribution . Therefore, I argued, the
Theory and Research in Social Education, Vol. VII, No. 1, Spring 1979
by College and University Faculty Assembly of the National Coun-
cil for the Social Studies .
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statements have as possible consequences the confirmation in learner's
consciousness of the legitimacy of existing inequalities and institu-
tional privileges . Among the exigencies of providing support for -
of socializing children to - prevailing political and economic arrange-
ments, is the societal need to legitimate and make `sense' of those
which are potentially unpalatable .
Conversely, by identifying and analyzing textbook omissions, dis-
tortions and rationalizations, one reveals the workings of society . The
rationalizations, omissions and distortions in school materials, I ar-
gued, are not random or desultory, nor are they merely a consequence
of author `bias.' Such textbook misrepresentations, rather, identify
deep characteristics of the economic and political order : through them
one highlights those arrangements that must be justified in order
to secure support and future participation in social institutions. By
using textbooks as social products in this way, one illuminates the
conjunctures of social interest, political and economic power and
school knowledge .
One premise of this and similar arguments (see, for example, Sharp
and Green, 1975; Bernstein, 1977 ; and Bourdieu and Passerson, 1977)
is a concern - implicit or explicit - with social `structure .' It is ar-
gued that school knowledge represents in ideal (or ideological) form
the material (socio-logical) configurations of interaction and oppor-
tunity that characterize the social order . From this point of view one
might look historically at social products such as school curriculum
(or, say, methods of evaluation) and attempt to describe them in terms
of their expression of relationships that are rooted in long-range social
developments. School knowledge is seen as not only reflecting and
resulting from, but as contributing to the historical developments .
Another premise of the argument as I perceive it is that social `struc-
ture,' although clearly a human concept, an abstraction or organizing
principle, is not merely that - as Levi-Strauss, for example, has sup-
posed.' Rather, social structures embody empirical relationships and
patterns of reward, constraint, meaning and opportunity that char-
acterize and delimit individual action, belief and social choice . They
provide the social context. While individuals may be said to `make'
their own history, this construction takes place within real boundaries
of external forces and limitations . Moreover, these boundaries are
not always perceived by individuals, who often remain unaware of
constraining social or ideological influences. Thus, in western society
there is free choice that is nevertheless limited by institutional re-
strictions, socially approved beliefs, and available political and eco-
nomic options - all of which may converge to produce, for example,
legal and occupational constraints on overt behavior . 2
Additionally, in this approach to the study of education, it is often
argued that the form of schooling in society is dependent upon the
socio-structural base for its dominant principles of organization and
content. This material base consists of structures of the mode of pro-
duction, of the relations of social and economic power and distribu-
tion, of patterns of social and economic development, and of the or-
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ganization of the work force and the dynamics of class interaction .
These characteristics of the socio-economic order generate under-
lying `grammars' which provide meaning to sequences of school ac-
tivity, and which, furthermore, provide the social imperative to what
`counts' as educational knowledge . 3
While underlying characteristics of social organization are thus
seen as determining the general form and content of schooling in a
society, it should also be noted that there are contradictions, dis-
crepancies and areas of independence and autonomy which also char-
acterize the relationship between education and the socio-economic
order (see, e .g ., Bernstein, 1977 ; MacDonald, 1977) . These areas of
conflict affect education as a reproducer of the work force and as a
reproducer of the social arrangements of power and production. They
may emerge as disjunctions, for example, between school output (`too
many' liberal arts students) and the input required by the economy
(workers with scientific or technical skills) (MacDonald, 1977) .
Another discrepancy is apparent in occasional disjunctures of the
social relations of some educational environments and future work
environments (e.g., between educational environments that are par-
ticipatory, negotiated and relatively free, as in some open classrooms,
and work situations to be encountered later which may be tightly
controlled, routinized and fragmentary (Bernstein, 1977) .)
Thus, while schooling may be broadly determined by social pat-
terns and contexts, it is also somewhat autonomous . However, in
western society, perhaps especially in the U.S., schooling is often
viewed as if it were primarily or entirely autonomous - as if it were
a complex of neutral or `objective' social institutions . The educational
literature, for example, is dotted with slogans calling for `humanistic
education,' and for education that `meets the needs of the individual .'
The prevailing technical goals of education are assumed to be the
creations of educators, rather than as economically and socially con-
tingent types. Thus, schooling is often not revealed in its underlying
forms - as conditional upon structural' configurations of society -
but is perceived in its phenomenal forms only, as the product of choices
of autonomous individuals .
Educator "Mindlessness"
It is in this context of the surface and deep realities of schooling and
society that educator `mindlessness' can be situated and its social
assumptions examined . In 1970 Charles Silberman popularized the
view that the reason schools teach what they do, and' often fail in their
efforts to, say, `humanize,' individualize or meet the needs of students,
is because of educator `mindlessness .' Schools often `fail' because
teachers, administrators, etc ., do not anticipate possible outcomes
of what they do. Mindlessness involves lack of thought about " . . . pur-
poses, and about the ways in which techniques, content and organiza-
tion fulfill or alter purpose" (Silberman, 1970, p . 379. Cited by Shaver,
1979, p . 6) .
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Now it is true and important that - just as "in a forest there is no
`sound' unless there are ears to hear it," schools would not exist with-
out persons . Or, to return to the present topic, socio-structural priori-
ties and exigencies are realized through human activity . The con-
cept of potential `mindlessness' speaks to individual activity in society,
and rightfully identifies the individual as an important element of
analysis .
However, embedded in this view is an assumption that, it seems
to me, prevents social understanding on the part of educators (or
others) and thereby vitiates efforts to effect substantial change in
school "techniques, content and organization ." The concept, for exam-
ple, when used to explain school failure, de-focalizes the complex of
social forces and economic and political interests in which education
is embedded . The concept, by focusing on individuals, trivializes the
constraints and sanctions that impinge on educators as social actors ;
it mystifies the contributions of history, and of society and culture to
schooling. Educational institutions are thus reified, appearing both
timeless and eternal, and yet changeable by mere individual cogita-
tion. The power of individuals is at once conflated, and deflected from
those paths down which it might travel the farthest . The historical
possibility that schools do more or less as they are `supposed' to is
precluded. Extra-educational institutional impingements (e.g ., jurid-
ico-economic priorities and distributions) are - incidentally - legiti-
mated and absolved .
Just as the concept places undue power on educators, it also places
undue blame on them. Educators, especially school practitioners are,
I would argue, very often the `victims' (as are students) of hierarchies
and contexts that support some choices and make other choices very
difficult. These barriers to free choice are, moreover, not always sur-
mountable if one expects to maintain one's position in the institu-
tional hierarchy .
This concept of individual culpability, which flows easily from argu-
ments that give explanatory priority to individuals, is implicit in
much contemporary educational research. It is embedded, for example,
in educational evaluation and psychological findings that attribute
to `lack of student interest,' `low ability,' different or `deficient' family
language or culture, or to teacher indifference, what may in fact be
economically compatable failure to provide all groups or social classes
successful pedagogy and/or `complete personal development .'
A less familiar consequence of the concept of individual culpability
is its incidental (and also economically compatable?) misrepresenta-
tion and disguise of the power of social structure and ideology on school
form and content - through its underlying assumption that educa-
tional choices are primarily autonomous, and not the exercise of
options often occuring within a rather narrow range of available social
and cultural possibilities . In order to provide an example of this ex-
planatory limitation of this view, an attribute of schooling that can
be examined as a `critical case' will now be discussed .
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Social Studies Knowledge as a Critical Case'
A critical case may be considered a phenomenon to be explained
or accounted for, whose successful exegesis will affect the perceived
utility or explanatory power of a paradigm or point of view. Quota-
tion marks appear around my usage of the term because the follow-
ing `exegesis' is only partial .
In the attempt to account for the form and content of education in
society, one can take as a critical case how and why schools of a cer-
tain period teach what they do . (This is, it seems to me, essentially
what Durkheim did in his discussion of the evolution of secondary
education in France . By certain well-chosen examples, he contrasted
his own historicist view of the development of education with the view
popular in his own time that to determine what should be done in
education one need look only to the future, not to the past. Perhaps
his clearest case is his analysis of French Jesuit and Classical pedagogy
and curriculum as an effort to resist perceived cultural threats to
the French Catholic Church (Durkheim, 1977) .
The phonomenon chosen as a `critical case' here is the thematic con-
tent of school social studies in the U .S. in this century . It will be sug-
gested that major themes or general organizing principles of this con-
tent can be explained by applying the argument that powerful in-
terests and contingencies embedded in socio-economic arrangements
and histories will define school knowledge . The curriculum selec-
tions of individual educators are thus viewed as normally occurring
within broad social and historical parameters ; the choices of edu-
cators are in this sense more `complicitous' than explanatory . Through
the compliance of individuals, that is, socio-structural principles will
be realized in social studies curricula ; through educational activity
that supports and `carries out' the political, economic and other insti-
tutional requirements, sanctions and beliefs, societal imperatives
will materialize in school settings .
It appears to me that school social studies knowledge in this coun-
try in the present century has exhibited at least the following major
themes :
1) A focus on constitutional and other legal manifestations of politi-
cal democracy. (In civics and in history, the governmental process,
its political leaders and events are emphasized .)
2) A valuing of social harmony, orderly change via reform, social
compromise, political consensus and progress . (Indeed, social progress
is very often described as having resulted from the utilization of exist-
ing methods of political participation and consensus (e.g ., voting in
elections) .)
3) An emphasis on individual freedom and individual opportunity
that accompany political democracy - e.g., the free press, freedom of
religion and speech .
4) A focus on the economic freedom, opportunity and progress pro-
vided by "the American economy." This is accompanied by a silent
Journal 53
theme of avoiding the everyday realities of industrial work, economic
participation or actual patterns of ownership and distribution . (The
"American" economy is detached from its historical roots and con-
temporary European manifestations. Economic freedom is described
as the freedom to own property, to work where one wants at the job
one wants, and in recent decades, in the freedom to choose from a
plethora of consumer goods ; it is also (since World War II) manifest
in descriptions of international power and prestige `free enterprise'
has brought the U .S .)
5) Intense nationalism and national chauvanism or patriotism -
i.e ., Americanism . (This Americanism is often manifest in social
studies curriculum by attributing numbers one through four above
to `unique' characteristics of U .S. political and economic institutions .
It is also sometimes represented by what are often called `middle-
class values' - attitudes that might otherwise be seen simply as
those which support the economic and political order : industry and
hard work, efficiency, personal cleanliness and propriety ; and per-
sonal accountability to society - or to some order higher than one-
self (such as the nation, or in earlier textbooks, to God, or moral prin-
ciple) . One might compare these attitudes to values of dissent, ethnic
and social class identification, or institutional and social culpability
and responsibility for all members of society .)
These themes in social studies knowledge can be distilled into seven
Key Words: Individual, Freedom, Opportunity, America, Democracy,
Industry, Progress . I would argue that these words - and the curricu-
lum organizing principles they represent - can best be understood
as ideological representations and legitimations of political, juridical
and economic relationships of power and resource in the U .S. The
perquisites inherent in these relationships constrain what will `count'
as social science curriculum selections of fact, concept and value .
To firmly attach these principles to their material base, one needs
to take an historical view of the development of western society: from
feudalism and monarchy to mercantilism and the free laborer (the
former peasant, freed from the bonds of the land and the landed gen-
try; free to migrate to the city, to seek employment or merchant status) ;
to the rise of the merchant and the mobile `middle classes,' and of
nation states. During these changes in economic and social relation-
ships were generated compatable and supporting notions of individual
political and juridical freedom, e .g ., political democracy, which codi-
fied and protected the new conceptions of freedom to work and to own
property and the political rights of citizenship and participation in
government. More recently, several key economic themes can be
attached to the development in this country of large-scale, highly
efficient industry, and the concomitant necessity (in a competitive
profit economy based on political consent), for an accepting - and
actively consuming - public .
Our key ideas can be seen as modern equivalents to the principle
of `divine right' of monarchs, as analogues to the expressions of social
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responsibility of lords to landed serfs, or perhaps as functionally
similar to visions of eternal damnation promised heretics by the
mectieval church. In a shorter, more recent time-span, our key educa-
tional ideas correspond to religious catechisms in the `textbooks' of
Puritan New England (see Smith, 1967) ; to textbook descriptions of
the "sub-human Negro race" during decades of a slave economy (see
Elson, 1965) ; and to the curriculum themes of `class struggle,' `revo-
lution' and `workers' state' that one sees in curriculum materials in
contemporary socialistic societies (see, for example, Bragin, 1975;
Chen, 1978; Council on Interracial Books for Children, 1973 ; and
Votey, 1978) .
Within these broad socio-structural and ideological parameters,
every-day curriculum choices in this country can be seen as 1) ap-
plications of the principles or themes to `local conditions;' 2) expatia-
tions; 3) individual permutations and/or variations of the themes .
(The rather wide latitude available in western society regarding in-
dividual permutations and variations of dominant cultural themes
contributes much to the popular view that there are no ideological
parameters or boundaries constraining our thought . For a similar
analysis regarding artistic expression in societies, see Bourdieu,
1971). In any case, cultural themes and key educational curriculum.
ideas are connected to material social arrangements, and to changes
in these arrangements . They are ideas that are thus not only struc-
turally related to the mode of production, ownership and distribu-
tion, but to social groups that are empowered by this mode . And they
may result in social legitimation of same . Social studies content,
then, rather than being `selected' by teachers from an infinite store
of equally possible choices, is largely imposed by the ideological and
material constraints of society .
A Continuing Problematic and the Power of Individuals
I have argued the case that broad themes of social studies knowledge
represent, primarily, the ideological representations of socio-structural
forces and configurations, and only secondarily the choices of edu-
cators. Schools and school knowledge are like they are because society
is like it is .
However, this view is not without its own problematic. If social
structure and the broad sweep of history impose educational choices
and the form of education in society, then how do educational and social
change occur? What is the motive force of history? Indeed, to return
to our original problematic in somewhat altered form, what is the
role of individuals vis a vis new social structures, and whence comes
the `power' of individuals who have no obvious social clout? Once
again, while the concept of critical thought versus individual `mind-
lessness' may not be explanatory, it is certainly suggestive .
That is, since social structures can only be imposed by the every-
day compliance of individuals, we can look to `enlightened' individuals
to resist this imposition and to create the conditions that will foster
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social change . For it will be through individual activity - although,
I would argue, individual activity undertaken collectively - that new
or altered socio-structural relationships will be produced . (While I
have argued that there are social structures, and there are impor-
tant historical forces, and that the general form of schooling in society
will depend on these, I have not argued or meant to imply historical
inevitability to society or social development . I would argue, to the
contrary, that there is no such pre-determination .)
Changes in the structural arrangements of economy and resource
in societies have almost always entailed substantial shifts in power .
(Changes from a slave economy in the southern U.S ., for example,
involved the abdication of absolute power of whites over blacks .)
Social changes are a result of activity by those who desire and sup-
port such changes; they do not just `happen.' One problem, then, is
to `raise the consciousness' of those without power in society - e.g .,
contemporary minorities, women or the poor - to make them aware
of their social and historical location, and of the ideological attributes
of knowledge and beliefs that may have been made available to them .
One can contribute to social change by revealing to such individuals
their situation of `oppression' - as Paulo Freire has already sug-
gested (Freire, 1971) . It could be argued that power for those who do
not have it in our time resides in their collective resistance to domina-
tion . 4
However, within the present view the problematic of sorting out
the contribution of individuals and social structures to society and
to change is not resolved . I have, for example, peremptorily dis-
counted the possibility of historical "laws of development," but have
not accounted for the genesis of social structure - nor, indeed, for
the possible ideological basis of the belief in social structure . And it
would not be easy to show how the liberation expected from personal
`enlightenment' or a `critical' education differs significantly from
what would be proposed by simple permutation of various social
themes described above as `merely' ideological (and thus suited to
the preservation of prevailing political and economic arrangements) .
Moreover, it is not clear how the key ideas of culture and of social
science originate . Do they merely `rise' as ephemoral mists, from a
somewhat murky base of matter? - which is rather implied in the
present argument. Or, are they perhaps the ideas that have gained
dominance as a result of struggles past and present between social
groups competing for the opportunity to disseminate their own world
views and desired meanings?
Acknowledging, however, the limitations of my own `structural'
as well as other `individualistic' views, (and recommending further
discussion among educators to increase awareness of the importance
of such issues) I can suggest on the basis of my argument several
activities for educators who would, through their work, increase the
power of individuals and groups to resist social imperatives and to
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wring fundamental changes in social, cultural and educational "tech-
niques, content and organization ."
In one's professional activity, with students and by contributions
to the professional literature, one can attempt to increase popular
understanding of society and of society in history . One can make
available information and analyses that de-mystify the complex of
social forces in which social institutions such as schools are embedded .
One can illuminate the ideological consequences of educational con-
tingency on material concerns . In this way one counters educator
`mindlessness' and explanations based on mindlessness - for these
accounts merely confirm the legitimacy of, and thereby contribute
to the perpetuation of prevailing unequal economic and social re-
lationships and distributions . One can, by making available alterna-
tive analyses, begin to reveal the workings of society . One contributes
to dialogue that is `truly' critical by bringing into public conscious-
ness underlying social realities that are not readily apparent, and
by subjecting these to inquiry and to political scrutiny . By revealing
society, by thus increasing social understanding, educators can en-
hance others' ability to recognize activity that will improve both
society and education . For example, to this end it becomes important
to identify the implications of the failure of educational institutions
to remedy for blacks, women and increasing numbers of white male
workers, limited access to occupational opportunity. This, of course,
is to point to the failure of education to equalize unequal economic
structures of priority and allocation. One then argues that in order
to prevent unequal political and economic allocations, more (or even
different) education will not suffice . We must, in addition, go to the
root of the problem and eliminate unfair economic and political prac-
tice .
By questioning, thus, the efficacy of educational solutions to eco-
nomic distress, one encourages more direct attempts to produce equal
structural arrangements of political and economic power and re-
source. One contributes, in this way, to social conditions that would
make equal public schooling a logical possibility .
Notes
'Levi-Strauss argues that the term social structure has nothing
to do with empirical reality :
Passing now to the task of defining "social structure," there is a
point which should be cleared up immediately . The term "social
structure" has nothing to do with empirical reality but with
models which are built up after it . This should help one to clarify
the difference between two concepts which are so close to each
other that they have often been confused, namely, those of social
structure and social relations. It will be enough to state at this
time that social relations consist of the raw materials out of which
the models making up the social structure are built, while social
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structure can, by no means, be reduced to the ensemble of the
social relations to be described in a given society . Therefore,
social structure cannot claim a field of its own among others in
the social studies . It is rather a method to be applied to any kind
of social studies, similar to the structural analysis current in
other disciplines . . . [A social] structure consists of a model meet-
ing with several requirements . . . (Levi-Strauss, 1967, p . 271) .
2For recent philosophical expression of this view, see Marcuse
(1968), Schroyer (1975), and Gouldner (1976) .
3For expressions of this argument see the work previously referred
to of Bourdieu and Passeron (1977), Bernstein (1977), and Sharp
and Green (1975) ; see also Bowles and Gintis (1976) .
41 would remark at this point that the domination of some by others
appears so far (in various forms) in all modern societies: socialistic
as well as capitalistic .
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Theory and Research in Social Education is designed to stimu-
late and communicate systematic research and thinking in social
education. The purpose is to foster the creation and exchange of ideas
and research findings that will expand knowledge about purposes,
conditions, and effects of schooling and education about society and
social relations .
Conceptualizations and research from- all of the social sciences,
philosophy, history and the arts are needed in clarifying thinking and
practice in social education . Manuscripts are welcomed on topics such
as those that follow :
Purposes of social education;
Models, theories, and related frameworks concerning the develop-
ment, diffusion, and adoption of curricular materials ;
Instructional strategies ;
The relation of the social sciences, philosophy, history and/or the
arts to social education ;
The politics, economics, sociology, social psychology, psychology,
anthropology, philosophy, and/or the history of social education ;
Alternative social organizations and utilizations of the school for
social education ;
Comparative studies of alternative models of social education ;
Models of and research on alternative schemas for student par-
ticipation and social action ;
Relationship of different pre- and in-service patterns of teacher
training to social education ;
Models of the utilization of objectives in social education and re-
lated research findings ;
Implications of learning theory, child development research, social-
ization and political socialization research for the purposes and
practice of social education;
The relationship of different independent, explanatory variables
to educational achievements in the area of learning about society
and social relations ;
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The social organization, climate, cohesion of schools and other
school characteristics as independent, explanatory variables pre-
dicting to general educational achievement .
Form for Submission of Manuscripts
In order to facilitate the processing of manuscripts, authors are
asked to follow the procedures noted below :
1. Manuscripts should be typed with a dark black ribbon, clearly
mimeographed, or multilithed . Authors should avoid submitting ditto
copies of articles unless clearly legible. Some corrections in dark ink
will be accepted . Copies containing numerous corrections will be re-
turned for retyping .
2 . Four copies of each manuscript should be submitted . This will
speed up the reviewing process and guard against loss of manuscripts .
3 . Everything should be double-spaced including footnotes and
references .
4 . Since manuscripts will be sent out anonymously for reviewing
and due to the fact that the abstracts will be published, the author's
name and affiliations along with an abstract of approximately 100
words in length not exceeding 125 words should appear on a separate
covering page. Information identifying the author, position, and in-
stitutional affiliation should appear on a separate page .
5 . No responsibility is assumed for loss or injury to manuscripts
submitted for publication .
Manuscript Style
1. When citations are made, the author's name, publication date,
and page (where necessary) should be enclosed in parentheses and
located directly in the text. The complete reference will be included
in a "References" section at the end of the article . For example, "Another
problem arises if inductive methods are used to teach a generalization .
The generalization may be reified, treated as a fact, when all generaliza-
tions, empirical or theoretical, are, as Popper argues, only corroborated
for the time being (Popper, 1959) ."
2. Do not cite references by means of footnotes .
3 . Only substantive footnotes should be sequentially numbered
within the text and located at the end of the manuscript.
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4 . References should be alphabetized and located at the end of the
manuscript. They should take one of the following forms :
Hanna, Paul R., and Lee, John R., "Generalizations from the
Social Sciences," in Louis J . Hebert and William Murphy (eds .),
Structure in the Social Studies (Washington: National Council
for the Social Studies, 1968) .
Kaltsounis, Theodore, "Swing Toward Decision-Making," Instruc-
tor, 80(April, 1971), 45-56 .
Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chand-
ler Publishing Company, 1964) .
Reston, James, "Primary and Secondary Questions," New York
Times, February 14, 1971, E-11 .
5. Each table should be placed on a separate page and placed in a
separate section at the end of the manuscript . Arabic numbers should
be used for numbering tables; they should be numbered consecutively
throughout the manuscript . Show where they belong in the text by
the following note :
Table One About Here
6 . Figures should be submitted in their final form. Use India ink
and place them on separate pages in a separate section at the end of
the manuscript . Number them and locate them in the text in the same
way as tables .
7. Send Manuscripts To:
Professor Thomas Popkewitz, Editor
Department of Curriculum and Instruction
225 North Mills Street
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, WI 53706
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